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IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
KNITGOOD WORKERS' UNION, LOCAL 155,
UNITE, AFL-CIO

Union

-andCRYSTAL ART CORPORATION AND WORKPROS,
INC.,

Employer

-X

Before:

Eric J. Schmertz, Arbitrator

Appearances:

For the Union:
Kennedy, Schwartz & Cure P.C.
By: Thomas M. Kennedy, Esq.
113 University Place, 7th Floor
New York, New York 10003

-andLeila Maldonado, Esq.
60 East 42nd Street, Suite 1736
New York, New York 10165
For the Employer:
Kaufman, Schneider & Bianco, LLP
By: Richard M. Howard, Esq.
390 North Broadway
Jericho, New York 11753

INTRODUCTION

The Undersigned was selected by KNITGOOD WORKERS'
UNION, LOCAL 155, UNITE, AFL-CIO (LOCAL 155) and CRYSTAL ART

CORPORATION (CRYSTAL) and WORKPROS, INC. (WORKPROS)
(collectively, the Employer) to hear and decide a grievance
brought by LOCAL 155 against the Employer alleging a violation of
the parties' 1999-2002 collective bargaining agreement.
Hearings were held on the following dates in 2001:
March 13th, March 15th, April 27th and May 31st.
record was made for each day of hearing.

A stenographic

The parties were

represented by counsel throughout the hearings who were afforded
a full opportunity to call and examine witnesses and to introduce
documentary evidence.

The Arbitrator's oath was waived.

were no objections to the conduct of the hearing.

There

The parties

have filed post-hearing briefs.

ISSUE

At the March 13, 2001 hearing, the parties stipulated
the following issue:
Has CRYSTAL ART CORPORATION or WORKPROS, INC.
violated Article I and/or 24 of its
collective bargaining agreement with LOCAL
155, and if so, what shall be the remedy?
RELEVANT CONTRACT PROVISIONS
Article I: Bargaining Unit and Union Recognition
The bargaining unit shall consist of all
full-time and regular part-time production,
maintenance, shipping, and receiving
employees employed by the Employer at its

facility located at 57-65 48th St., Maspeth,
New York 11378, including regular and trial
period workers, but excluding supervisors,
office clerical and guards. It is agreed
that the Union represents the majority of the
workers in the bargaining unit and that the
Union is the sole and exclusive bargaining
representative for all such workers. Neither
the Employer nor any of its agents shall
directly or indirectly discourage membership
in the Union.
Article 24:

Successorship

This Agreement shall be binding on any
purchaser, assign or transferee of the
Employer in which any principal of the
Employer or principal or management official
of PERFECT ART has an ownership role. In any
event, the Employer shall give as much notice
as is reasonably possible to the Union of any
intended sale or transfer of the business.
Article 26:

Management Rights

The Employer has both the legal
responsibility and the sole right to manage
its business except as specifically limited
by this Agreement.

POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES
UNION

CRYSTAL, sold, transferred or assigned New York
production work to a commonly held and controlled affiliate
company, CHARDAN INC. d/b/a/ PERFECT Act (PERFECT) for the
purpose of evading its obligations to its employees under the
parties' first collective bargaining agreement (CBA).

CRYSTAL

agreed in Article 24 of that CBA that the contract would be

binding upon any purchaser, assign or transferee of CRYSTAL if
that purchaser, assign or transferee was an entity in which any
principal or management official of PERFECT had an ownership
role.

Since the principals of PERFECT have, by definition, an

ownership in PERFECT, the contract is violated if PERFECT is a
purchaser, assign or transferee of CRYSTAL within the meaning of
Article 24.

The evidence proves that it is and further reveals

an obvious and clumsy attempt by CRYSTAL at subterfuge, which
only underscores the Employer's intent to violate the contract.
By its actions, the Employer violated the successorship clause in
Article 24 and the recognition clause in Article 1. As a remedy,
the more than 100 CRYSTAL employees who were laid off in October
and November of 1999 should be made whole for lost wages and
benefits through the end of the contract, CRYSTAL should pay for
the contribution to the contractual health care fund and it
should reimburse the Union for lost dues.

EMPLOYER
The grievance must be dismissed because the Union did
not prove CRYSTAL violated the contract as alleged.

The CBA was

intended to only prohibit CRYSTAL from transferring all or
substantially all of its New York business to PERFECT.

The

contract does not prohibit CRYSTAL from subcontracting any work
to PERFECT or to any other entity or from working through other
companies outside of New York as it had done before the Union was
certified to represent the Employer's employees.

The Employer

closed its New York operations for legitimate business reasons
and thereafter had most of its work done through companies in
other states and Mexico.

There was no transfer of business to

PERFECT in violation of the CBA, only a continued subcontracting
relationship which, despite a temporary increase in dollar
volume, never approached anywhere near CRYSTAL'S sales volume.
CRYSTAL did not and could not transfer its New York business to
PERFECT because CRYSTAL's operations were always much larger than
PERFECT'S.

"Jonah cannot swallow the whale," and did not.

The

evidence relied upon the Union is incorrect, unreliable and
unpersuasive.

The Employer exercised its contractual management

right to close its New York operations and then transferred the
bulk of that business elsewhere in and out of the country and
exercised its further management right to maintain a
subcontracting relationship with PERFECT.

Moreover, PERFECT is

not CRYSTAL'S alter ego nor is PERFECT a disguised continuance of
CRYSTAL and they are not part of a single enterprise.

FACTS

LOCAL 155 is the certified bargaining agent for
CRYSTAL's production, maintenance and other workers employed in
its New York facility at 48th Street in Maspeth, Queens.
By letter dated September 9, 1996, Brent Garren, the
Union's attorney and representative during negotiations,
transmitted to CRYSTAL'S counsel a model contract for purposes of
discussion.

Included among the Union's initial proposals was a

broad successorship clause which would have made its agreement
with CRYSTAL binding on CRYSTAL'S subsidiaries, affiliated firms,
successors or assigns, entities which were to be identified by
"facts tending to establish any direct or indirect connection or
interest between them or tending to establish a plan, scheme, or
device by an Employer or principal to avoid or evade the
provision of this Agreement by or through such subsidiary or
affiliate, directly or indirectly."

There was also included a

one-sentence management rights clause granting to the Employer
"the right to manage its business except as specifically limited
by this Agreement."
On September 11, 1997, the attorney then representing
CRYSTAL faxed to Garren the Company's "non-economic proposals for
negotiations."

Included in that package was a lengthy management

rights clause that gave CRYSTAL the right, among others, to

"extend, maintain, curtail, sell or terminate all or any part of
the operations of the Employer" and retained to it "all of the
rights and functions of management, except to the extent that
they are expressly and specifically modified or limited by the
written, specific provisions of this Agreement."
On January 21, 1998, the Union submitted a revised
successorship clause, which was substantially similar to the one
it initially proposed.

It also proposed the same one-sentence

management rights clause.
The Union was concerned during negotiations about what
Garren considered to be a close relationship between CRYSTAL and
PERFECT.

CRYSTAL and PERFECT both produce and sell framed

artwork and PERFECT occupied part of the space at CRYSTAL'S 48th
Street location during the parties' negotiations.

Moreover,

Garren always believed that CRYSTAL and PERFECT were essentially
the same company because he believed that they were owned and/or
controlled by the same persons.

In response to an inquiry Garren

made about the relationship between CRYSTAL and PERFECT, Thomas
Bianco, counsel and lead negotiator for CRYSTAL, wrote Garren on
March 10, 1998 stating that "CRYSTAL ART and CHARDAN [PERFECT]
are unrelated entities engaged in different segments in different
segments of the framed art industry" and are "separate operations

in separate areas within the building known as 57-65 48th Street,
Maspeth, N.Y."
By letter dated November 9, 1998, Garren requested
certain information from CRYSTAL, including "a list of all firms
with which CRYSTAL ART subcontracted for any work of the type
performed by bargaining unit employees within the last three
years..."According to Garren, he was never provided that
information and he was never told during negotiations that
PERFECT was a subcontractor for CRYSTAL, although he admits that
there was a great deal of discussion about subcontracting.
CRYSTAL's witnesses who spoke to that issue claim that Garren was
told that PERFECT was a subcontractor of CRYSTAL.

(See my

discussion the bargaining history infra).
By letter dated December 9, 1998, Garren was informed
that the Employer would be permanently ceasing production at its
Maspeth facility, but that the Employer expected to maintain a
"warehouse presence and operation."

Garren was told that the

decision was not based on "labor costs," but on the Employer's
determination "that production of a marketable, competitive
product is not possible under the regulatory environment
governing its product," that being a reference to fines imposed
by OSHA because CRYSTAL had used in its operation a glue
containing excessive amounts of methylene chloride.
8

According to Garren, the Employer's decision to cease
New York production changed the course of negotiations because
the costs of the Union's health insurance proposal, a major issue
during bargaining, would be substantially decreased because the
size of CRYSTAL'S workforce would be substantially decreased.
The Union then submitted a greatly modified successorship clause.
All of the language in the earlier proposals was deleted and the
following was substituted:
This Agreement shall be binding on any
purchaser, successor, assign or transferee of
the Employer. The Employer shall give as
much notice as is reasonably possible to the
Union of any intended sale, transfer, merger
or consolidation of business.
The Union's management rights proposal was unchanged.
After further negotiation, the succesorship clause was
modified to read as it does in the signed contract.

The

management rights clause was not modified and it was then
incorporated into the final agreement.
Contemporaneously with the parties' agreement upon a
CBA, the parties entered into a "Settlement Agreement" dated
February 1, 1999.

That Agreement settled an outstanding unfair

labor practice complaint brought under the National Labor
Relations Act and a separate wage action under the Fair Labor
Standards Act.

The Settlement Agreement provides an economic

severance package for employees who resigned or were laid off

prior to September 1, 1999, bumping rights by seniority, and a
back pay agreement in settlement of the NLRB complaint.

The

Union also agreed not to object to the settlement of the
penalties imposed against the Employer for the OSHA violations.
Set forth next, are excerpts from the witnesses'
testimony concerning the negotiations as relevant to Article 24.
Testimony by Garren
[T]he Company asserted their right to — the
importance to them of an ability to sell the
Company unfettered. This was both for
practical and ideological reasons a
management right.
[0]ur concern...that we repeated continuously
was to protect the employees, their
employment and to protect the Union's
representation rights and that, therefore, we
wanted the successors clause.
[Addressing the modified successors clause].
[W]e could agree...to get an agreement done,
a compromise. We would agree they could have
a sale to be legitimate third party but we
were not going to agree to any sale, transfer
in any way shape or form if moving the
business over to an entity in which they or
PERFECT, that is CRYSTAL ART of PERFECT, had
an interest.
[Addressing subcontracting]. [Tjhat our
positions on subcontracting at this point was
that what we wanted in the contract was that
none of the work performed by our bargaining
unit should be subcontracted.
Q.
Do you recall then what was said as to
why the management didn't want the bar on
subcontracting?
10

A.
I believe it was generalities about what
we were told was they wanted the flexibility
and right to run the business any way they
want.
We took it [subcontracting prohibition] out
because management would not change its
positions and we needed to take it out to
reach a contract.
There was a specific discussion of workflow
among the Company's facilities. We made it
very clear we did not have a problem with
that historic workflow between the Miami and
L.A. and NY facilities. (emphasis added)

Testimony by Bianco
Q.
[W]ere there discussions in those
negotiations of subcontractors?
A.

There were.

Q.
Could you tell me how those discussions
arose?
A.
Well, their proposal basically said we
couldn't subcontract. It was a very broad
limitation, not allowed at all. And the
Company's position was we have subcontracted
and are going to continue to, we have to do
it. So we wanted to be able to do it.
Q.
Was the history of some contracting
discussed in any way?
A.

It was.

There were questions about it.

Q.
When I say the history I mean CRYSTAL
ART subcontracting.
A.
Brent inquired about what they did and
Lou Siciliano explained the historical
practices. He talked about they did it two
different ways. Basically, they had other
locations within the Company affiliated into
those. I think they had one in Chicago, Los
11

Angeles, Florida and had just opened up
Mexico. And he explained the work and
percentages they did there. He also talked
about how they did subcontracting with other
side companies, local companies.
Q.
What was the final result of the
negotiations concerning subcontracting?
A.
Well, they didn't want us to
subcontract. At some point we were trying to
come up with language that would effectuate
what they were interested in with our need to
be able to subcontract. And I couldn't come
up with language. They asked a couple of
times, do you have a proposal? I said I just
can't articulate it. Because of the type of
industry it was that we couldn't have any
limitation on subcontracting, we just
rejected the proposal out of hand. They
accepted that there would be no limitation on
subcontracting.
Q.
Was there also discussion of successors
and assigns?
A.

Yes.

Q.
Could you describe that discussion or
those discussions?
A.
The concept of runaway shop AM & N up in
successors and assigns as well. Again Brent
conveyed the idea that they did not want
CRYSTAL to take everything they had here [New
York] and sell it to another company, sell it
to PERFECT ART or some other company, that
was set up in a sham transaction...Their
concern was they didn't want us to sell it
[CRYSTAL] TO PERFECT ART. We don't want you
taking what you have over here [at
CRYSTAL]...and all of a sudden it is over
here [at PERFECT]. Everything is over here.
That was the discussion.
Q.
So, as a result of the final agreement
reached, was there any prohibitions upon
subcontracting work from CRYSTAL to PERFECT?
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A.
There was no prohibition on any subcontracting to any company including PERFECT.
The only limitation had to do with successors
and assigns. They said Tom, don't rub it in
our face. We don't want everything in
CRYSTAL then everything going over here to
PERFECT. That was the limitation, that no
company that was kind of set up as, you know,
a sham transaction.
Q.
In the initial sessions that you
attended, did Brent Garren make a point that
the Union was trying to make sure the
employers didn't cheat on the contract by
diverting work through a new company?
A.
It was a theme that the idea of a
runaway shop was a theme that came up
constantly. What he said was that they
wanted to protect themselves, us, from the
economic consideration by the employer to
move "a runaway shop." [Garren] was not
going to sign a contract with just minimums.
Not sure what the word "minimums" refers to.
Q.
As you sat there at the end of 1997, Mr.
Garren had already, on a number of occasions,
indicated to you that job security was a very
important consideration, correct?
A.

That's right.

Q.
And PERFECT had not yet been mentioned
by any party in these negotiations at least
as I read your notes...?
A.
The name PERFECT I don't know if it is
mentioned...
Q.
Do you have any recollection of it being
mentioned by the party prior to this point in
1997, where this issue of job security was
being discussed.
A.
I remember the name PERFECT came up
frequently. As to what particular dates it
states, my notes, I may or may not have
13

reflected in my notes. At some point was a
very big issue and obviously its reflected.
Q.
[Ijdentify for me what Mr. Garren said
after Lou Siciliano's explanation of the
historic practice.
A.

Don't want to upset historic practice.

But don't want to let company put employees
on lay off and let other companies do the
work. Brent was clear he didn't want to just
sign a contract and then everything that was
here [at CRYSTAL] was all of a sudden gonna
be someplace else.
I wanted [Garren] to understand what was
happening, that it was clear the work
distribution was among company facilities and
outside companies, other companies.
[CRYSTAL] will not contract out to another
company if it will result in a loss of job
based on economics, if we can agree on
economics. What they had conveyed was we
understand you're subcontracting, continue to
subcontract.
Our conversation was Brent had conveyed the
impression, the idea that they didn't want us
to rub their faces in it. He said that
phrase a lot, didn't want our company to just
sign a contract and all of a sudden
everything is gone and they were left with
nothing. And what we had talked about was
the idea of allowing sub-contracting as long
as their whole unit wasn't gone, that we
didn't just have a runaway shop. We said the
idea was we had no intention of doing that
and the idea if we can come up with some
language and everything else works out,
particularly economics, then everything else
works out...the sub-contracting was gonna
take place, the work force was gonna go up
and down and we didn't want any contract
violations. Company language on
subcontracting, I say none, yours [union's]
is rejected.
14

Q.
Directing your attention to the language
[in Union proposal] concerning successors and
assigns, did you make any response to that
language?
A.
[W]e didn't want anything. That was our
proposal. I remember a discussion on this
particularly. Brent -- I remember the visual
especially — this is when Brent used the
phrase, Tom, come on, you can, you know, deny
it all you want, I know they [CRYSTAL and
PERFECT] are one in the same. We don't want
you to rub our nose in it. We don't want
everything to be over here at CRYSTAL, and
then all of a sudden everything is over here
at PERFECT. We said, you know, we are not
gonna sell everything to PERFECT. He
[Garren] said what if you set up another
company, or someone from PERFECT sets up
another company? We are not gonna do that
either. Then agree to it. We will agree to
it. We are not gonna do it.
Q.
Did the parties discuss the definition
of purchaser, successor, assignee or
transferee at the time this was discussed?
A.
Didn't really. We were talking of a
sham transaction...and the idea was this
wholesale moving over, you know, that all of
a sudden everything is over here then low and
behold they have to go to their members and
everything is over here at PERFECT, can't
have it Tom.
Q.
So is it your understanding of this
clause, that it would only be triggered by a
situation in which all of the assets of
CRYSTAL, including the California and Florida
and potentially Chicago operations were sold
to another employer, then the contract will
apply to that employer?

A.

No. No.

We were talking about the New York operation.
They [Union] didn't want to have a situation
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where all of a sudden you had 130 employees
over here at CRYSTAL and then you look up a
year later and PERFECT has 130 employees, and
they are out in the cold.
Q.
Did the parties discuss what the
consequences of a violation would be, if
CRYSTAL did not, in fact, ensure that any
purchaser, assign or transferee of the
employer became party or representative of
the contract?
A.
Specifically I don't recall. I think I
just assumed that no matter what happened
Brent was gonna try and say that, you know,
any entity in the area was also, was really
CRYSTAL. But we didn't talk about mechanics
or anything like that. (emphasis added)

Testimony by Lou Siciliano, WORKPROS, INC.1
Operations Manager
PERFECT ART would perform work for CRYSTAL
ART. We would farm out or trade out some of
our small orders to PERFECT ART to produce
for us.
Q.

Was that a nature of sub-contracting?

A.

Yes.

Q.
Did that topic ever come up in
negotiations of the collective bargaining
agreement between UNITE and CRYSTAL ART?
A.

Sub-contracting, yes.

Q.
Did you ever discuss [in negotiations]
whether CRYSTAL ART subcontracted prior to
the collective bargaining agreement?
A.

Yes.

Q.
What did you advise them [the Union's
representatives]?

16
1

WORKPROS provides labor for CRYSTAL in New York. WORKPROS is named in the
as the. F.mnlnver alnnp with CRYSTAL

A.
That we do, and did and still do
subcontracting. And that it was very
important to us as part of the negotiating
contract.
Q.
Was PERFECT ART the only company with
whom CRYSTAL ART subcontracted?
A.

No.

(emphasis added)

Such other facts as are material to the disposition of
the grievance, including financial information, are discussed in
my opinion.

OPINION
It is clear from the record that Garren told CRYSTAL'S
representatives often during negotiations that the Union saw
PERFECT as a threat to the continued employment of CRYSTAL
employees given the similarity in the companies' production line,
the similarity of the skills of their respective employees, the
location of PERFECT'S operation at the relevant time, and what
Garren considered to be the companies' interrelated ownership and
control.

Just as clearly, the Union secured from CRYSTAL during

negotiations certain concessions prohibiting CRYSTAL from using
PERFECT to do CRYSTAL'S New York work.
the foregoing testimony shows.

CRYSTAL admits this, as

What is in dispute between these

parties is the extent of the prohibition in Article 24 or, what
triggers the prohibition.

17

When resolving any contractual grievance, the
Arbitrator's function is to ascertain and give effect to the
parties' intent.

In ascertaining that intent, resort is made

first to the language the parties used in their agreement for
that is the best evidence of what the parties mutually intended.
Only when the language is ambiguous does negotiating history
properly becomes an aid to the interpretation of the Agreement.
In my view, Article 24 is clear and unambiguous.

So

reliance on the foregoing testimony about the negotiation of
Article 24 is unnecessary and indeterminative.
requires two separate inquiries.

Article 24

First, whether there is an

entity, which is a purchaser, assign or transferee of CRYSTAL.
Second, whether that entity is one in which any CRYSTAL principal
or PERFECT principal or management official has an ownership
role.

As noted before the second is plainly satisfied.

PERFECT'S principals by definition have an ownership role in
PERFECT.

The inquiry thus becomes whether PERFECT is a

purchaser, assign or transferee of CRYSTAL.
The prohibition in Article 24 runs to "any" purchaser,
assign or transferee.

Although the parties did not discuss the

definition of purchaser, assign or transferee, they need not have
done so because those terms have a common and well-understood
meaning which would have been known to experienced labor counsel.
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By the clear language of Article 24, PERFECT became an assign or
transferee of CRYSTAL upon its acquisition, by sale or otherwise,
of any of CRYSTAL'S property, rights or interests.

Had the

parties intended to limit the bar to all or substantially all of
CRYSTAL'S work, and not to less, they could and would have said
so.

Instead they barred "any."

While I do not apply this

interpretation to de minimus transfers, I do apply it to
transfers that are of significant quantity.

The bargaining

history, to the extent that it is probative, is certainly not to
the contrary.
Let me pursue the matter of intent further. According to
the Employer, Article 24 prohibits only a total or near
total transfer by sale or otherwise of CRYSTAL'S business to
PERFECT.

But that could not have been the parties' intent for

the very reason that both parties knew that PERFECT could never
take over CRYSTAL'S operations, which were many times the size of
PERFECT'S operations.

It was impossible, or at least nearly so,

for "the Jonah" in PERFECT to have swallowed the "CRYSTAL whale,"
yet that is what the Employer argues the parties mutually
accepted as the trigger for Article 24.

Negotiated contract

language must be construed to give effect to all provisions.

I

cannot conclude that the parties intended a clause that occupied
so much of their time in negotiations to have virtually no
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realistic or likely meaning and to provide virtually no
protection to unit employees or to the Union against the loss of
unit work, except if that loss was from a total transfer.
Comment about subcontracting is appropriate given that
CRYSTAL'S defense centers on a claimed unfettered right to
subcontract unit work to PERFECT.

The Union is incorrect in

claiming that all subcontracting to PERFECT is prohibited by CBA,
but the Employer is just as wrong in claiming that subcontracting to PERFECT is entirely unrestrained.

A certain

restriction on CRYSTAL'S right to subcontract work to PERFECT is
brought into effect under the breadth of Article 24.
contracting is clearly a type of transfer of work.

SubTo the extent

CRYSTAL increased its subcontracting to PERFECT after it closed
its operations in New York, that expanded subcontracting must be
scrutinized under the Article 24 restrictions.

In other words,

work previously performed by CRYSTAL but now performed by PERFECT
may well qualify as a transfer from the former to the latter.
From my review of the record, I am persuaded that
CRYSTAL'S owners were directly responsible for the transfer to
PERFECT of work, accounts receivable, equipment, supplies,
customers, and former CRYSTAL employees and supervisors.

The

totality of these transfers is certainly significant if not
substantial.

Of these, an apparent accounts receivable transfer
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to PERFECT in January 2000 of $825,000 is by itself substantial
and is wholly unexplained by CRYSTAL'S witnesses whose
Disclaimers of any knowledge or understanding about that
transaction are not credited.

Moreover, I am persuaded that the

other transfers represented something other than arms length
sales, hiring and subcontracting transactions at fair value
between separate business entities and were not part of a
subcontracting practice.

Rather, those transactions much more

resemble a close and cooperative relationship between two
companies with common interests and common owners.

Unexplained,

for example, is why Randy Greenberg of CRYSTAL in Los Angeles was
receiving and reviewing PERFECT'S sales and account information.
Indeed, these transactions, together with the increase in
subcontracting are indicia of an "allied" relationship between
CRYSTAL and PERFECT.

(See Douds v. Metropolitan Federation of

Architects 75F.Sup. 672)

However, I need not and do not reach

the parties' alter ego, disguised continuance or single
enterprise arguments.

My finding that Article 24 was violated,

and the remedies ordered answer the issues adequately.

Similarly

I need not reach the allegations concerning a violation of the
recognition clause in Article 1.
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The remedy for the violation of Article 24 lies in
Article 24 itself.

It makes the CBA binding on PERFECT.

CRYSTAL, of course, is liable for the violation of its own CBA.

\r considerations, however, come into play when fashioning a

remedy.

Although the transfers made by CRYSTAL to PERFECT

violated Article 24, most of CRYSTAL'S New York production work
was assigned to companies out of state and Mexico, transfers
beyond the reach of Article 24.

Therefore, CRYSTAL and PERFECT

are not liable for one hundred percent of the employee and Union
losses under the CBA.

The contractual liability must be

responsive and in proportion to the transfers from CRYSTAL to
PERFECT and not the transfers of work to Mexico or other states.
There is insufficient evidence in this record to
precisely fix the amount of actual damages or the number and
identities of the employees entitled to monetary awards.
what periods of time.

Or for

Instead, my Award shall be in traditional

form, directing reimbursement and payment of wages and benefits
to the employees wrongly laid off because of the wrongful
transfer of work from CRYSTAL to PERFECT.

And a similar award to

the Union Health Fund for contributions that would have been made
and should be made by the Employer(s) for those employees.
Payment of dues, if any, shall be determined by the contract.
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Particularization of said damages will require
negotiations between the parties in implementation of my Award.
I shall direct that the parties engage in those negotiations and
I shall retain jurisdiction for the purpose set forth in my
Award.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator,
and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the abovenamed parties, makes the following AWARD:
CRYSTAL ART CORPORATION and WORKPROS, INC.
violated Article 24 of its collective
bargaining Agreement with LOCAL 155 UNITE.
By the express terms of Article 24 the
collective bargaining agreement is binding on
PERFECT ART.
Therefore, CRYSTAL ART CORPORATION (WORKPROS,
INC.) and PERFECT ART are jointly and
severally liable for the damages and remedies
referred to below.
Those employees laid off or otherwise
terminated because of the improper transfer
of work from CRYSTAL to PERFECT shall be
reimbursed by CRYSTAL and PERFECT for wages
and benefits lost. Payments to the Union
Health Fund that would have been made on
behalf of those employees shall be paid to
the Fund by CRYSTAL and PERFECT. Payment of
dues shall be determined and implemented by
the terms of the collective bargaining
agreement.
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The parties are directed to engage in
negotiations to determine the precise amounts
of the foregoing monetary damages and for
what periods of time. I shall retain
jurisdiction to make those determinations if
the parties are unable to do so directly.

Eric J. Schmertz, Arbitrator
DATED:

November 13, 2001

STATE OF NEW YORK

)
ss:

COUNTY OF NEW YORK )
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.
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IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
OPINION AND AWARD
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 277

-and4C FOODS CORP.
-X

The stipulated issue is:
Under
the
terms
of
the
labor
agreement between 4C FOODS CORP. and
LOCAL
277,
was
JOHNNIE
GOMEZ
discharged for just cause or reason
on June 21, 2000? If not, what shall
be the remedy?
A hearing was held on March 22, 2001 at which time Mr.
Gomez,

hereinafter

referred

to

as

the

"grievant"

and

representatives of the above-named Union and Company appeared.
All concerned were afforded full opportunity

to offer evidence

and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
Arbitrator's

The

Oath was waived.

At the end of the hearing the

Union made a verbal summation.

The Company, subsequently filed a

summary brief.
The grievant was discharged under the provisions of the
"Absentee Policy" of the Company's "Conditions of Employment."

The Absentee Policy sets forth a progressive sequence
of penalties for certain specified numbers of "occurrences" of
"absences," "late(ness)" or "leaving (work) early," as follows:

OCCURRENCES
Occurrences are defined as follows: Absent from work, late to work and
leaving early from work. Employees in violation of this definition
shall receive occurrences as follows:
(A)

Whole day absence

One (1) occurrence

(B)

One (1) or more consecutive days
absence (with doctor's note)

One (1) occurrence

(C)

Late or leaving early (5 mins. or more)

One-half (1/2) occurrence

(D)

Late or leaving early (less than 5 mins.)

One-quarter (**) occurrence

Occurrence Penalties
The following number of occurrences within the last twelve (12) month period
will result in the following discipline:
Step 1:

After four (4) occurrences a documented wverbal warning".

Step 2;

A total of five (5) occurrences within a twelve (12)
month period results in a "written warning".

Step 3:

A total of six (6) occurrences within a twelve (12) month
period results in a ""suspension of one (1) day".

Step 4:

A total of seven (7) occurrences within a (12) month period
results in a "suspension of three (3) days".

Step 5:

A total of eight (8) occurrences within a twelve (12) month
period results in a wsuspension of five (5) days".

Step 6;

A total of nine (9) occurrences within a twelve (12) month
period results in wtermination".

The Company asserts that the grievant accumulated each
of the total "occurrences" from Step 1 through Step 6 within a
twelve (12) month period, and was disciplined appropriately at

each step, leading to his discharge (for "a total of nine (9)
occurrences within a twelve (12) month period") on June 21, 2000.
None of the occurrences or the imposed discipline
prior to Step 6 (termination) were protested or grieved by the
grievant, nor are they disputed in this arbitration.

Aside from

pointing out that some of the reports of occurrences in the
disciplinary steps contained some original errors, it is clear
that those errors were corrected, so that the occurrence
quantity, nature and times were made accurate in support of the
respective disciplinary steps.

So these original errors, timely

corrected, are not material to this case.
However, one occurrence of a "lateness" of 3^ hours on
June 21, 1999 is in dispute.

When that "lateness" was added in

June to other earlier occurrence(s) by the grievant, his total
"occurrence" points increased, moving him from Step 5 to Step 6
and triggering his discharge.
The disputed "lateness" was due, claims the grievant,
to a "job-connected rash" he contracted "from his uniform," and
he was late because he saw a doctor for the condition.

The

Company requested a doctor's note, which the grievant did not
produce until July 27th after he was discharged, though the
Company asked for it three times earlier.
There were adequate grounds for the Company to reject
the note.

The grievant's delay in producing the note is

unexplained and prejudicial to him.
condition was not certified by

The grievant's medical

the doctor as "work related,"

3

nor did the grievant file a claim for workers compensation.

(F)

clearly requires that the claimed medical condition for which a
doctor was seen and about which a doctor provides a note be a
"Workers Comp. Injury," not a routine doctor visit for a non-work
related condition.

In this record is only the grievant's

assertion that the rash was from his uniform, the bonafide of
that claim as a "Workers Comp. Injury" was not satisfied either
by the doctor's note, or a Workers Compensation award or even a
Workers Compensation claim.
Moreover the burden of proof on this issue and the
discharge itself rests with the grievant and the Union.
contract language is clear, albeit unusual.

The

It reads in

pertinent part:
"...the Union or the employee shall have the
burden of showing the discipline, suspension
or discharge was not for just cause or
reason."
So, the burden of establishing an excused occurrence
under (F) is on the grievant and the Union.

That burden was not

met.
The Union's principal argument is that the Absentee
Policy has been administered in an uneven and discriminatory
manner.

And that other employees with more absences or

"occurrences" than the grievant, have not been discharged.

In

this regard, the record before me does show that in the manner
the Company implements the Policy, the progressive discipline

Steps (1 through 6) assume a threshold application when the
number of occurrences is considered.

So that until and unless

the progressive Steps 1 through 6 are imposed, the number of
occurrences, even if a total of nine or more before Step 6, will
not result in the employee's discharge.
For example, as the Union points out, because the
Company reviews the attendance records once a month, an employee
who accumulates "nine occurrences" in that month, would not be
discharged unless he/she was at Step 6 in the progression.
Instead, that employee would be subject only to discipline from a
"verbal warning" to "suspension of five days" depending on the
chronological step that employee may be at that time.

Or in

other words, irrespective of the actual total of accumulated
occurrences, an employee will not be discharged until he/she has
been subjected to each of the disciplinary Steps 1 through 6.
So, points out the Union, though the grievant accumulated nine or
ten occurrences within the twelve (12) month period, there were
other employees, cited by the Union, who had accumulated many
more, but were lesser disciplined because their accumulation was
at a point where they had not yet had the full sequence of
progressive discipline steps imposed.
Specifically, by example, the Union cites the case of
employee WASSEEM QAMMAR.

Mr. Qammar, contends the Union,

accumulated 16 or 17 occurrences and received only a written
reprimand.

The Company explains that despite Qammar's record,

the Policy required that he be reprimanded before he could be
further or more severely discipline.

The Union points to this

and other referred to situations as obvious disparities in
imposition of the discharge penalty imposed on the grievant, and
therefore, a violation of the well-settled arbitral rule that
discipline must be imposed equally and evenly on employees
similarly situated.

For to limit Qammar's discipline to a

reprimand after 16 or 17 occurrences and to discharge the
grievant after 10 occurrences is discriminatory to the latter.
On the face of it, the details of the Qammar case and
others of the same type would, if factually sustained, show an
unevenness of discipline and an inconsistency of application of
the Absentee Policy which could mitigate the grievant's penalty.
I do not reach that conclusion, however, because the Qammar case
and others cited were not fully litigated factually, but
primarily because of my further findings that follow:
The inequality arises, in my view, from the Company's
procedure to monitor and apply the Policy on a month-to-month
basis.

A monthly look allows for multiple occurrences within a

month that may exceed the later steps of the discipline
progression, but result only in the next penalty under that
progression.

Whereas, if the absentee records were examined

regularly, on a day-by-day basis, the progressive discipline
steps could be administered at the precise point that the number
of occurrences were accumulated.

It would mean, by example that

once 9 occurrences accumulated, the affected employee would have
been warned, and suspended and discharged all within whatever
period the accumulation occurred, even if within one month (or
shorter).

And if so, all employees accumulating occurrences

would be subject to both the progressive discipline set forth in
the Steps 1 through 6 and to the penalties that attach to each,
again within whatever period of time was involved.

If so, there

would be little or no disparity or unevenness among offending
employees.
However, for one particular but critical reason,
evidence of or a conclusion of disparity or unevenhanded
treatment is not determinative in this case.

And that reason is

that the Absentee Policy, with its disputed implementation was
bilateral bargained and contractually agreed to by both the
Unions and the Company.
There is no dispute that the Policy was the product of
joint negotiations.
Company.

It was not unilaterally promulgated by the

I conclude that the joint agreement of the parties

included an implied, if not explicit, agreement on an attendance
review on a monthly basis rather than on a continuing day-to-day
basis.
The Policy provision entitled "Reduction of
Occurrences" gives contractual support for a monthly review of
absentee records.

It provides for the "removal" of a prior

occurrence if an "employee...achieves one consecutive month without

a single additional occurrence."

(emphasis added)

This means,

of course, a month-by-month review for the purpose of reducing an
accumulated record.

It follow logically, that if the parties

negotiated a monthly review for removal of occurrences, they
agreed impliedly for monthly review generally of employee's
attendance records, for both the reduction of occurrence and for
the imposition of discipline at the proper step sequence for
further accumulation of occurrences.

To review one and not the

other each month would be illogical.
As this was the bilaterally bargained agreement, the
Union which does not herein challenge the basic validity of the
Absentee Policy, cannot now challenge a part of that Policy namely the monthly review, or the apparent disparities of
discipline resulting from the monthly review.

In short, if there

be disparities they are the reflection of the bargained
arrangement.
(Indeed, without the need to recite them here, a daily
review of an employee's record may well produce other inequities
about which the Union could complain.)
Determination, however, is that the grievant
accumulated a quantity of unexcused occurrences which, based on
the bi-laterally negotiated Policy, mandated his discharge.

I conclude with a reference, again, to the contractual
burden of proof, namely:
"...the Union or the employee shall have the
burden of showing the discipline, suspension
or discharge was not for just cause or
reason."
Based on the foregoing findings the grievant and the
Union have not met the requisite burden.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
The discharge of JOHNNIE GOMEZ was for just
cause or reason.

Eric J. Schmertz, Arbitrator

DATED:

May 2, 2001

STATE OF NEW YORK

)

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

ss:

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,
ADMINISTRATOR
x

IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
IUE LOCAL 359
-andGENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY

:
:
:
:
:

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #11E3000032401

x

The stipulated issue is:
Whether the discharge of JOHN CRUMB was for just cause?
not, what shall be the remedy?

If

A hearing was held on June 19, 2001, in Albany, New York,
attended by representatives of the above-named Union and Company
and by Mr. Crumb, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant." The
Arbitrator's Oath was waived. Post-hearing briefs were filed.
The grievant is charged with violation of the following Rule of
the Company's Code of Conduct, which by its terms carries the
"normal" penalty of discharge.
THE FOLLOWING ARE EXAMPLES OF OFFENSES WHICH WILL NORMALLY
RESULT IN AN EMPLOYEE'S DISCHARGE FOR THE FIRST OFFENSE:
a) Theft or attempted theft of Company property or services
or the property or services of an employee, whether by
larceny, robbery, misapplication of property or the
unauthorized or unlawful possession or use of such
property or service.
The propriety, enforceability and the appropriateness of the
penalty are not challenged by the grievant or the Union. Rather,
it is asserted that the grievant did not commit the violation.
So, if found culpable, the penalty of discharge, as imposed by
the Company should be upheld.
The evidence is clear and concurring that the grievant knowingly
violated the Rule. I find he attempted a theft of Company
property within the Rule prohibition.
Employees are permitted to remove material from the Company's
premises for their own use or otherwise, provided they obtain an
authorized Gate Pass, signed by supervision; provided the
material to be removed, as so authorized, is specifically listed
on the Pass, and provided, as the Pass in question expressly
states, the material is "of no value."
The grievant's Gate Pass listed the material he was authorized to
remove as:
"approximately 10 pieces mixed scrap metal.
scrap wood."

Two truckioads

What was found in his truck as he was about to leave the plant
and when apprehended is set forth on Exhibit C (in evidence) and
attached hereto and made a part hereof.
The list, and the materials thereon as found on the grievant's
truck are not disputed nor does he deny taking that material.
The grievant's explanations are rejected. He claims that the
additional items were "discarded" and found by him in dump. The
evidence shows that much of the material was in good condition,
new or unused, and ultimately returned by the Company to its
active inventory and use.
His assertion that he "forgot" to get his Gate Pass "expanded" to
include the many additional items is simply unbelievable.
Considering the nature of the additional material, much of it new
or still useable, and not meeting the condition of "no value," I
have no doubt that supervision would not have expanded the Gate
Pass.
In short, I must conclude that the grievant was attempting to
remove a host of Company property not covered by the Pass, not
authorized for removal and not eligible for removal.
Significantly, also, the evidence shows that some of the
material, particularly the oil drum, was purposefully hidden from
view.
Because it is irrelevant, I need not speculate or determine how
the grievant would have been able to get through a required
inspection by the security guard. The grievant's obvious attempt
to do so constitutes "attempted theft" and warrants his discharge
as the Rule mandates. Considering the quantity of the material
and the absolute nature of the Rule, any mitigation of the
contractual penalty because of the grievant's lengthy service and
apparent good prior record, is for the Company to consider, not
the Arbitrator.
The Undersigned duly designated as the Arbitrator, and having
duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named parties,
makes the following AWARD:
The discharge of JOHN CRUMB was for just cause.

Eric J. Schmertz, Arbitrator
August 16, 2001
STATE OF NEW YORK
)
ss:
COUNTY OF NEW YORK )
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator
that I am the individual described in and who executed this
instrument, which is my AWARD.
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AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,
ADMINISTRATOR

-X
IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
IDE LOCAL 359
-andGENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #11300023211

-X
The stipulated issue is:
Whether the discharge of TIMOTHY AGARS was for just cause? If not, what shall the
remedy be?
A hearing was held in Albany, New York on October 31, 2001 at which time Mr. Agars
hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and representatives of the above-named Union and
Company appeared. All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument
and to examine and cross-examine witnesses. Post-hearing briefs were filed.
The grievant was discharged for violation of Section 4(i) of the Company's Code of
Conduct by "sleeping during working hours whether at the work area or away from the work area."
Though it points out that the Code of Conduct was unilaterally promulgated by the
Company, the Union does not challenge its general validity or enforceability in this proceeding.
Rather, the grievant and the Union on his behalf deny the charge.
However, the evidence adduced by the company convincingly established that the grievant
was sleeping in a secluded area, with the warehouse lights dimmed, in an executive chair, semireclined during his night shift and work hours.
The remaining question is whether the penalty of discharge was mandated under an
absolute interpretation and application of Section 4(i) of the Code, or whether a lesser penalty is
warranted and allowable because of mitigating circumstances.
Section 4(i) reads:
The following are Examples of Offenses which will Normally Result in an
Employee's Discharge for the First offense:
(i)

Sleeping during working hours, whether at the work area or away
from the work area (emphasis added).

It is a logical interpretation that the word "Normally" contemplates and allows for the
consideration of mitigation factors. It means that there may be times and circumstances which
would call for discipline for the stated offense, but for a penalty short of discharge. Otherwise
there would be no purpose for a meaning of that conditional word.
I find mitigating factors in this case.
I think it reasonably possible that the grievant fell asleep, albeit willfully, at and during an
otherwise legitimate break period, and then slept into and through work time. Though not excused,
his actions may not have been planned or intended to go beyond an allowable break period.

Also, the grievant's shift was without managerial supervision. This is not to say that absent
a supervisor, employees who sleep on the job may be excused. Rather it is to say that the
Company's decision to run the night shift without a supervisor contributed a temptation to sleep.
Additionally, a purpose of supervision, in addition to directing to operations, is to correct and
rehabilitate employee's errors and misconduct, generally before imposing summary discipline.
Here, supervision suspected earlier that employees on this shift were sleeping;
sleep equipment (i.e. pillows etc.) were earlier discovered; and productivity was below
expectations.
Yet, without warnings or corrective action, supervision conducted a surprise visit with the
express purpose of catching employees asleep. Again, this is not to say that the surprise visit was
improper. Rather, I think that under the regular and continuing circumstance of a shift without a
supervisor, a progressive discipline step of warning to the employees about what super-vision
suspected would have been more traditional if not appropriate.
But the most critical mitigating factor, in my view is that the grievant has had seventeen
years of service with virtually an unblemished prior disciplinary record. Such long and satisfactory
service is regularly recognized by arbitrators as a mitigating factor, and I so recognize it in this
particular case.
A lingering question may be whether this decision is inconsistent with my prior decision in
the discharge case of JOHN CRUMB. There I held that Rule 4(a) ("Theft or attempted theft of
Company property") was "absolute" and compelled discharge irrespective of that employee's
service or prior record.
I see no inconsistency. First, theft or attempted theft is markedly different and more serious
than sleeping on the job. It is well settled in industrial relations that the former warrants summary
dismissal and the latter, usually, progressive discipline. The Code word "Normally" leaves no
room for consideration of mitigation factors in theft or attempted theft cases because mitigation is
not a factor in those matters. But, considering the manifest difference between theft and sleeping
on the job, particularly as in this case when the Company has not shown a specific nexus between
plant safety and the work the grievant did not do while asleep, the word "normally" does allow for
mitigation. So under the particular circumstances of this case, the penalty of discharge for sleeping
on the job is not "absolute," and this decision and my prior Award in the Crumb case are not
inconsistent.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and having duly heard the proofs and
allegations of the above-named parties, makes the following AWARD:
The discharge of TIMOTHY AGARS is reduced to a suspension. He shall be reinstated
but without back pay. The period of time from his discharge to his reinstatement shall be
deemed a disciplinary suspension for violation of Rulejl(i) of the Code of Conduct.

DATED: January 7, 2002
STATE OF NEW YORK

Eric J. Schmertz, Arbitrator
/
)
ss:

COUNTY OF NEW YORK )
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator that I am the individual described
in and who executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.
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AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,
ADMINISTRATOR

-X
IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
IUE LOCAL 359
-andGENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #11300023221

-X
The stipulated issue is:
Was there just cause forthe discharge of RICHARD FOGLIA? If not, what shall the
remedy be?
A hearing was held in Albany, New York on December 19,2001 and January 24,2002 at
which time Mr. Foglia, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and representatives of the abovenamed Union and Company appeared. Al! concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer
evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses. The Arbitrator's Oath was
waived. Post-hearing briets were filed.
The grievant was discharged for violation of Section 4(i) of the Company's Code of
Conduct by "sleeping during working hours whether at the work area or away from the work area."
The grievant and the Union on his behalf deny the charge. The Union does not challenge the Code.
With regard to the specific charge, I make the same findings of fact that I made in the case
of TIMOTHY AGARS (decision of January 7,2002). Namely that without authorization and
during working hours the grievant was asleep on a ccbed" of chairs, with supporting pillows at his
side, with his shoes off with a headband over his eyes and with the room lights dimmed, I find that
he so positioned himself for that purpose and was asleep for a protracted period of time.
I reject as both unproven and irrelevant the claim that he was suffering from neck pain and
had taken pain-reducing mediation that made him ill. If he was ill in fact, he should have followed
other required procedures to gain authorization to leave work or seek medical treatment. Willful
sleeping on the job is not an appropriate response to illness or effects of medication, even assuming
the veracity of any such claim.
Nor was the grievant authorized to sleep by his shift leader (a non-managerial employee
who directed the third shift in the absence of supervision). At most, shift leader Bramski told the
grievant to "sit down and relax" for an hour. Bramski denied giving the grievant permission to
sleep or to position himself conducive to sleeping. Indeed Bramski acknowledged that sleeping on
the job was a dischargeable offense.
In short, I am persuaded, as with Agars, that the grievant was asleep for a period well
beyond any legitimate period of "relaxation," for no reason or purpose other than to sleep.
The remaining question is whether the mitigating circumstances I found present in the
Agars case obtain as well to the grievant. I decide they do not. There are several significant
distinctions, but the most critical and the one which I found determinative in the Agars case is that
Agars enjoyed a virtually unblemished prior disciplinary record over 17 years, whereas the

grievant's 18 years of service has been marred by many disciplinary offenses and penalties,
including, most significantly, a prior suspension for sleeping on the job. That single difference
determinatively distinguishes the instant case from Agars. so that I need not specify other
differences from Agars.
Section 4(i) of the Code of Conduct provides that the penalty of discharge "will normally
result" from sleeping on the job. In Agars I found that Section 4(i) allowed for consideration of
mitigating circumstance in reducing a discharge to a suspension, if as in that case, a progressive
discipline step of suspension was appropriate because of a prior clear disciplinary record. Here, the
grievant was previously disciplined for that offense with a suspension. So progressive discipline
had been applied.
That the grievant's earlier suspension in 1991 was imposed prior to the promulgation of
Section 4(i) of the Code is immaterial. It was and remains discipline for the offense and as such is
not diluted, but rather affirmed and codified in the subsequent enactment of Section 4(i). Though
the grievant's suspension was several years ago, I find no contractual provision for its expulsion.
Indeed Section 4(c) of the Code provides inter alia "all records of employee discipline.. .remain a
part of the employee's personnel file." Only '"warning notices, not suspensions" are inactivated
after one year.
So, the grievant was on notice from his earlier suspension. With the subsequent enactment
of Section 4(i) of the Code and its violation by the grievant as his second sleeping on the job
offense, I have no choice but to hold that his discharge under Section 4(i) was a proper exercise of
managerial authority under the uncontested provisions of the Code.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and having duly heard the proofs and
allegations of the above-named parties, makes the following AWARD:
The discharge of RICHARD FOGLIA was for just cause.

Eric I ScHmertz, Arbitrator
DATED: March 19,2002

STATE OF NEW YORK

)
ss:
COUNTY OF NEW YORK )
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator that I am the individual described
in and who executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION
ADMINISTRATOR

ASSOCIATION,
-X

IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
OPINION AND AWARD
CONNECTICUT HEALTH CARE ASSOCIATES
AFSC&ME
-andHALL BROOKE HOSPITAL
-X

The stipulated issue is:
Did the Hospital violate the collective
bargaining agreement between the parties when
it selected FRANK WRIGHT as the Craftsman to
be laid off on August 31, 2000? If so, what
shall be the remedy?
A

hearing

was

held

at

the

Hospital

in Westport,

Connecticut on December 20, 2000 at which time representatives of
the above-named Union and the Hospital appeared.

All concerned

were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and
to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
Because
Hospital

decided

it
to

experienced

financial

reduce

one,

classification of Craftsman.
Craftsman

by

difficulties,
employees

in

the
the

Mr. Wright, the grievance was the

selected to be laid off, leaving employed two other

Craftsmen, Libby Tornifoglia and Rocco Vitale.

With greater seniority than the grievant, Tornifoglia's
retention is not challenged by the Union.
However, Vitale was junior in seniority to the grievant
(the grievant's seniority date is June 30, 1988; Vitale's is
May 8, 1995).
The Union does not challenge the Employer's right to
effectuate a layoff for financial reasons. But in this proceeding
it asserts that if there was to be a layoff of a Craftsman,
Vitale should have been laid off, not the grievant.
The dispute involves the application and interpretation
of Article XI Section (3) of the collective bargaining agreement.
Said clause reads in pertinent part:
3. In the event of a reduction in the
work force, the following
factors
shall be considered:
a) ability to do the work;
b) seniority among the employees in
the classification affected... .Where
the Hospital reasonably determines
that factor "a" is relatively equal
seniority shall be determinative.

OPINION

Among
practice

in

the Union's
layoff

determinative factor.

arguments

situations,

is the

seniority

claim
has

that, by
been

the

That may be so, but that is not what the

foregoing contract language provides.

And it is well settled

that where past practice and clear contract

language are in

conflict, the past practice is prospectively immaterial, and the
contract language prevails.
Here

the

relevant contract

language

is clear. Only

where the "ability to do the work" is "relatively equal" among
the

employees

of

the

classifications

to

be

decreased,

does

seniority prevail.
In the instant case this means that if the grievant' s
ability and that of Vitale are "relatively equal" Vitale should
have been laid off and not the grievant.

But, if Vitale is

judged to have the greater ability, the grievant's layoff was
contractually proper.
In judging the relative abilities of the grievant and
Vitale, the Hospital examined the performance appraisals of both
employees

over

the

disciplinary records.

five-year

period,

1995-1999

and

their

It concluded that in the various appraised

categories, Vitale was superior to the grievant by a total score
of 4.07 to 3.81.1
Also,

as

part

of

the

performance

appraisals,

supervision wrote some observations which, asserts the Hospital,
are consistently more favorable of Vitale's work than that of the
grievant.
For example, in the 1999 appraisals the comments about
Vitale were:
"Rocco is willing to participate in any
maintenance function that he is needed. He
will complete any work order given him."
"Rocco is very versatile and is equally adept
at digging holes as he is in putting up new
doors."
"Rocco is a pleasure to have as a staff
member.
He
is cooperative,
skilled and
dependable."
For the grievant, the comments at the same time were:
"Frank does a competent job in performing
routine maintenance tasks related to grounds
and building."
"Frank does a good job in general maintenance
work. I would like Frank to show more
initiative about doing maintenance
tasks
unrelated to his skills."
"I would like Frank to be a little more
proactive about finding and doing other work
than work orders when he is available; also
to be as responsive and helpful as possible
to AC when he is on call."

\ score of 4 equates to "Exceeds standards" a score of 3
ecruates to "Consistentlv meets standards."

The Hospital asserts that the appraisal disparities,
during which Vitale exceeded the grievant in each of the five
years establishes Vitale with ability superior to the grievant
and

hence

is

determinative

on

the

contractual

question

of

into

its

relative ability.
Additionally,

the

Hospital

factored

conclusion the respective disciplinary records.

The grievant had

received several counseling

reports and disciplinary

Vitale's

of

Because

record

was

free

any

discipline

some of the grievant's warnings

or

warnings.

counseling.

related to his work

performance, the Hospital sees them as particularly relevant to
an ability assessment.
The
differences.

Union

discounts

the

performance

appraisal

What is material, it asserts is that the grievant's

overall evaluation from 1995 through 1999 was "fully competent."
And

that

as

all

three

Craftsmen

were

evaluated

as

"fully

competent," Vitale was not superior in ability to the grievant.
It is also asserted by the Union that the grievant was
not fairly treated from December 1999 when a new department head
was hired.

It claims

that

the new department

operational

meetings

with

Vitale

and

head had many

Tornifoglia,

thereby

learning of their skills and abilities, as well as establishing a
more personal relationship, but had no such meetings with the
grievant

and made no effort to
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grievant's skills.

learn

or

observe

the

The Union

further argues that the utilization of a

"new" system to judge ability -- i.e. reference to five years of
performance
grievant

ratings, was

for

layoff,

a procedure

when

under

designed

identical

to target the

language

in

the

Hospital's contract with the nurses' Union, only seniority was
used in deciding layoffs.

In this connection, the Union argues

that only after a decision was made to layoff the grievant, a
false and prejudicial evaluation of the grievant was prepared by
the new department head
comments,

designed

for the year

to justify

2000,

the Hospital's

with

unfavorable

action.

This,

contends the Union was a false or inaccurate assessment of the
grievant, and discriminatorily applied to "boot strap" its prior
decision to layoff the grievant.2
More particularly, the Union claims that the Hospital
and grievant's supervisor were biased against him.

That it was

erroneously reported that he "refused" training, when none was
offered; that he needed constant supervision, when, in fact, the
grievant spent most of his time responding to emergencies, with
few, if any, complaints about his work; that he was too quick to
hire outside contractors when, in fact, the authority to do so
was not his, but that of management, that he was wrongly faulted
for taking too much time to work on air-conditioners, when he had
never done that work before; and that because the grievant was

For example, for the first time in this year 2000 appraisal,
the grievant received a "2" rating (meets most standards);
while Vitale was rated in the "4" rancre (exceeds standards) .
2

assigned, essentially to respond to maintenance emergencies, he
was never given a chance

to display his skills or learn the

skills of other Craftsman's duties.
Finally,
disciplinary record
ability

or

his

classification,
warnings

the

Union

argues

is irrelevant
relative

especially

to

ability
where,

as

that

an

employee's

a determination
with

others

here,

his

of his
in

his

disciplinary

in the year before his layoff do not relate to his

general work performance, but rather to a minor error (turning
off a water valve) and to a conversation with a patient.
inasmuch as "counselings" are not disciplinary

And,

in nature, they

should not be considered in an ability evaluation.
In short,
"definitely,

the Union

distinctly

concludes

substantially

that Vitale was
or

significantly"

not
of

greater ability than the grievant, a standard recognized and
required by arbitrators.
The critical
"ability," but
added) .

In

contract

language

rather to "ability

that

respect

it

is

relates not

to do the work"
a

requirement

just to
(emphasis

closer

"qualifications" than to a general ability or aptitude.

to

In other

words, as I see it, "ability to do the work" is the present
ability or qualification to perform whatever duties of the job
classification of Craftsmen may be assigned.

And the broad-based

ability to perform any or all of those duties is especially
7

relevant and important if the work of the classification is to be
covered by two rather than three Craftsmen.
Based on the record before me, it appears that Vitale
and Tornifoglia were assigned to and performed work of a greater
variety

and

more

required

skill

classification, than the grievant.
conclusion

a "reasonable"

within

the

Craftsman

And I find such a fact and

determination within the meaning of

Article XI Section 3(b).
It appears undisputed

that the grievant's principal

work was in responding to plumbing emergencies

(i.e. inoperative

toilets), repairs of heating thermostats, checking boiler gauges,
and vehicle

maintenance and vehicle

inspections. He meets

a

schedule of preventive maintenance in those areas. At times, he
moves files from a building to storage, and at times "assists the
other two Craftsmen on projects."
However,

the

record

does

not

establish

that

the

grievant has the ability to perform certain important functions
performed by the other two Craftsmen.
sheetrock installation.

Notable are carpentry and

He testified that he "assisted with some

of that, in early stages and on a casual basis." I believe this
means that he helped transport the material but did not do either
the actual carpentry work or sheetrock. He testified that he did
that work when he was a private contractor, but the evidence on
that is not probative and not related to the carpentry and
8

sheetrock work required of the Hospital Craftsmen. The other two
Craftsmen can do that work. Also, his unfamiliarity with airconditioning maintenance is an example of the limited assignments
given him routinely and what I conclude is a lack of diverse and
multiple abilities that would be required of the two remaining
Craftsmen following the layoff.
This is not to say that the grievant could not learn
to take on these broader-based duties or that he did not do the
work assigned him satisfactorily, but rather that at the time of
the decision to reduce the Craftsmen
grievant

had

less

versatility,

from three to two, the

less

experience

and

less

capability than the other two.
In more

polite
was

terms,
"rigged"

the

Union

—

asserts

supported

that

by

the

grievant's

layoff

erroneous

evaluations

and false observations, and engineered by a biased

department head.
It

is well

capriciousness
Absent

such

and
clear

settled

that

discrimination
proof

(and

charges
must

I

also

of

be

arbitrariness,

clearly

include

proved.

proof

of

unreasonableness), the majority of arbitrators accord management
a presumption of validity and honesty in evaluating the ability
of its employees.
Here,
pre-planned

I share that view.
the Union

layoff

of

raises

some

suspicions

regarding a

the grievant, supported by faulty
9

rationale.

But,

I find

no adequate

proof

of such

a

scheme.

Rather, though the performance appraisals and the observations of
supervision may be debated as to meaning and relevance, I cannot
conclude that they are arbitrary, capricious, discriminatory or
an unreasonable indicia of ability.

Especially so when a larger

scope of duties than those routinely performed by the grievant is
at stake.

And I so find, the disputed evaluation in the year

2000 notwithstanding.
Additionally,

I find that an employee's disciplinary

record is not irrelevant to a determination of relative ability
between or among employees, provided the discipline cited is job
performance related. I do not agree that a cited disciplinary
record should be confined to the last year or two of employment,
nor depending

on its content, am I persuaded

reports" are to be ignored.

that "counseling

The question is whether discipline

or counseling reports relate to job performance, job attitude or
job attendance.

Such information is manifestly relevant, in my

view, to an employee's reliability, cooperativeness, initiative
and morale,

and

these

are

legitimate

factors

in

determining

"ability" or here, relative ability.
The

exhibits

show three warnings:
January

22,

1991;

of

the

grievant's

disciplinary

record

A charge of job insubordination on
a second

charge of job

insubordination

January 23, 1991; a job error on August 26, 1999; counselings
10

on

on May 1, 1995 for excessive absenteeism; on January 18, 1993 for
failure to report for work; on June 4, 1996 for negligence in
driving a van; on August 6, 1997 for failure to inspect a van; on
September

22,

1997

for

an

error

in

clearing

a

drain

with

chemicals; on August 26, 1999 for an error tripping a sprinkler
system; on July 8, 1997 for a horn blowing disturbance; and in
February 2000 for "interference with patient care."
grieved or otherwise challenged by the grievant.

None were

I deem all but

the last as relevant to job performance and a determination of
ability

between

employees

being

considered

Article XI Section 3 of the contract.

for

layoff

under

Though each may not be so

serious standing alone, the cumulative effort when compared with
Vitale's record which is unblemished, adds legitimate support to
the Hospital's judgment on which had greater relative ability,
and

rebut

arguments

of

arbitrariness,

capriciousness,

discrimination and even unreasonableness.
The Undersigned, duly sworn and having duly heard the
proofs and allegations of the above-named parties, makes the
following AWARD:
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The Hospital did not violate the collective
bargaining agreement when it selected FRANK
WRIGHT as the Craftsman to be laid off on
August 31, 2000.

Eric J. Schmertz, Arbitrator

DATED:

February 16, 2001

STATE OF NEW YORK

)
ss:

COUNTY OF NEW YORK
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.
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AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

In the Matter of the Arbitration Between

CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION,
Union,

- and HEALTH RESEARCH, INC.
Employer.

Arbitrator:

Eric J. Schmertz

Appearances:
Union by:

Daniel R. Simonette, Esq.
Fine, Olin & Anderson, P.C.
222 Broadway, 18th Floor
New York, NY 10038

Employer by:

Heather Diddel, Esq.
Whiteman Osterman & Hanna
One Commerce Plaza
Albany, NY 12260

AAA CASE NO.
13 300 OO143 99
(AUDREY GORE)

INTRODUCTION
In 1998, Health Research, Inc. (HRI) issued three Notices of Discipline to Audrey
Gore (Grievant), a Grade 13 Administrative Aide, each charging the Grievant with
multiple counts of insubordination, misconduct, inadequate performance and
incompetence. The first Notice of Discipline (NOD), issued February 12, 1998, contains
35 charges and many additional sub-charges covering the period September 1996 through
December 1997. The second NOD, issued April 23, 1998, contains 10 charges covering
the period from mid-November 1997 to early April 1998. The third NOD, issued
December 30, 1998, contains 7 charges covering the period of April 1998 through
December 1998. The Grievant was suspended without pay on the date of the third NOD.
Each NOD was grieved and the parties agreed to consolidate the grievances for
purposes of arbitration. Hearings were held on the following ten dates at which each
party was represented by counsel: April 13, 1999; May 6, 1999; June 28 and 29, 1999;
September 13, 1999; November 9, 12 and 15, 1999; February 2, 2000; and March 9,
2000. Each day of hearing was transcribed except the first day. There were no
objections to the conduct of the hearing. Each party has filed a post-hearing
memorandum.
ISSUES
The parties stipulated the following issues:
1. Was HRI's determination to terminate the Grievant for misconduct,
insubordination, inadequate performance and incompetency as set forth in HRI's Notices
of Discipline dated February 12, 1998, April 23, 1998 and December 30, 1998 unjust,

arbitrary or capricious in violation of §14.1 of the Agreement? If so, what should the
remedy be?
2. Was HRI's suspension of the Grievant a violation of §14.8 of the Agreement?
If so, what should the remedy be.
RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE 1995-1999 HRI/CSEA AGREEMENT
ARTICLE 14 - DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURE
14.1 No regular employee in this bargaining unit shall be
disciplined except for misconduct, insubordination,
incompetency or inadequate performance.
14.2 Such discipline shall consist of one or more of the
following: suspension; reprimand, loss of annual leave
accruals; fine not to exceed two hundred dollars ($200.00);
demotion; or discharge.
14.3 An employee charged with misconduct,
insubordination, incompetency, or inadequate performance
under this Article shall be considered innocent until proven
guilty. They shall be entitled to be represented by the Union
or by a private attorney at each stage of the disciplinary
procedure.
14.4 HRI shall provide an employee who is subject to
disciplinary action with a written notice of discipline by
certified mail or personal service The notice served on the
employee shall contain a description of the charges as well as
the proposed penalty to be implemented. The employee shall
be provided with a copy of this Article as well as two copies
of the notice which shall include the statement, "You are
provided with two copies of this notice in order that one may
be given, if you choose, to your representative.". The Local
President or his/her designee shall be informed, in writing, by
certified mail or personal service that a notice of discipline

has been served. The written notification to the Local
President or his/her designee shall state the penalty sought as
well as a brief description of the charges.
14.5 The Union, as representative of the employees, shall
have the right to appeal disciplinary actions taken in
accordance with this Article through the grievance procedure.
The Union shall supply a copy of the disciplinary appeal to
the local Human Resources Office, as well as the Employee
Relations Office in Buffalo. Such grievances shall be initiated
directly at the third step of the grievance procedure. To
provide the prompt resolution of disciplinary grievances, the
following time limits shall apply unless extended by mutual
agreement
(a) For filing of the disciplinary grievance at Step 2—
within fourteen (14) working days of receipt of the Notice of
Discipline.
(b) For conduct of the Step 2 review—within fifteen
(15) working days of receipt of the grievance.
(c) For issuance of the Step 2 decision-within four
(4) working days of the Step 2 review meeting.
(d) For submission of appeal to arbitration—within
fourteen (14) working days of receipt of the Step 2 decision.
14.6 (a) If a grievance, in which termination is the specified
penalty, is appealed to arbitration, the Notice of Appeal to
Arbitration must be filed with the Executive Director of HRI
for Albany Division, or the Director of Operations for the
Buffalo Division, in accordance with the time limits
established in 14.5 (d). Upon receipt of the "Notice", HRI
shall select an arbitrator from a predetermined list of mutually
agreed upon arbitrators. Such arbitration will be scheduled
within thirty (30) calendar days of the filing of the "Notice"
unless witness availability precludes such a schedule or an
extension of said time is mutually agreed to by HRI and the
Union Local President.
(b)
If a grievance arising from disciplinary action under
this Article is appealed to arbitration, the arbitrator shall limit

his/her review to whether the determination of the
Corporation was unjust, arbitrary, or capricious. If the
arbitrator finds that the determination of the Corporation was
unjust, arbitrary or capricious the arbitrator shall have the
power to impose such other penalty as she/he determines
appropriate or to direct that no penalty be imposed.
14.7 The penalty proposed in the Notice of Discipline shall
not be imposed until expiration of the time period for
submission of a disciplinary grievance. If the matter is timely
appealed through the grievance procedure, the penalty may be
modified at Step 2, but the modified penalty shall not be
imposed until expiration of the time period for appeal to
arbitration. If the matter is timely appealed to arbitration, the
penalty determined by the arbitrator shall be imposed upon
receipt of the award of the arbitrator. A settlement may be
reached at any stage of the appeal procedure.
14.8 Notwithstanding any of the above provisions, an
employee may be suspended without pay for either of the
following reasons (1) if HRI determines that there is probable
cause to believe that the employee's continued presence on
the job represents a potential danger to persons or property or
would severely interfere with operations...
ARTICLE 19 - GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE
19.1 Definitions
(a)
Grievance - A grievance shall mean any dispute
between a grievant and the Corporation over terms and
conditions of employment, except disputes seeking to amend,
add to, or subtract from this Agreement.
(b)
Grievant - A grievant shall mean an employee, or
group of employees, or the Union, who choose to use this
grievance procedure.
(c)

Days - Days shall mean calendar days.

19.2 General Provision
(a)
The designee of the Union shall be granted reasonable
and necessary employee organization leave for the
investigation and processing of grievances.
(b)
The Union shall be permitted to call witnesses at every
step to support their case.
(c)
Time limits established in this Article may be extended
or shortened by the mutual written agreement of the Union
and the Corporation.
(d)
In the case of a grievance affecting all employees of
the Corporation, the Union may initiate the grievance directly
at Step 2.
(e)
In the consideration of any grievance under this
grievance procedure, Step 1 may be waived by the mutual
written agreement of the Union and the appropriate Division.
19.3 Procedure
(a)
Step 1 - The employee and/or the Union grievance
representative are encouraged to discuss the grievance with
the employee's immediate supervisor, in an effort to resolve
the grievance informally. If the grievance is not resolved in
this manner, the employee and/or the Union grievance
representative may submit the Step 1 grievance to the
individual designated to represent the applicable Division of
the Corporation in writing on forms provided by the
Corporation. If a written copy of the grievance is not served
to the Corporation within thirty (30) days of the act,
occurrence, or event; or thirty (30) days from the time the
employee became reasonably aware of the act, occurrence, or
event giving rise to the grievance, the grievance shall be
deemed waived and there shall be no right to grieve. The
written statement of the grievance shall contain a description
of the act or omission complained of and the solution sought.
If the grievance is based on an alleged failure to comply with
a provision(s) of this Agreement, the statement shall indicate
which provision(s) of this Agreement are being violated. The
individual shall meet with the employee or Union within
fourteen (14) days following receipt of the Step 1 grievance.
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(b)
Step 2 - If the employee and/or Union grievance
representative is not satisfied with the Step 1 determination of
the grievance, or if no determination is issued by the Step 1
official within fourteen (14) days after presentation of the
grievance, they may, within fourteen (14) days thereafter,
appeal the grievance to Step 2. The Step 2 appeal shall be
made on the grievance form originally presented (if the
original is returned, or an added attachment otherwise) and
shall consist of a statement why the Step 1 determination was
unsatisfactory. A Step 2 appeal shall be submitted to the
Executive Director of the Corporation. The Executive
Director or his/her designee shall have the option of
determining whether a Step 2 meeting is required. If a
meeting is held, the Executive Director or his/her designee
shall issue a written response within seven (7) days after the
close of the meeting. When a Step 2 meeting is not held, a
written decision will be issued within fourteen (14) days of
receipt of the Step 2 appeal.
(c)
Step 3: Arbitration - If the Union is not satisfied with
the Step 2 determination of the grievance, or if no
determination is issued by the Executive Director or his/her
designee within specified time periods, the Union may appeal
the grievance to arbitration within fifteen (15) days of receipt
of the Step 2 decision or expiration of the time period listed in
19.3(b) above. The Union may appeal a Step 2 decision to
arbitration by filing a completed Submission to Arbitration, or
Demand for Arbitration with the appropriate regional office
of the American Arbitration Association with a copy
submitted to the Corporation concurrently. Thereupon the
arbitrator shall be selected in accordance with the rules of the
American Arbitration Association. The arbitrator shall hold a
hearing within thirty (30) days of their selection and shall
render a decision within thirty (30) days of the hearing;
except that such thirty-day periods may be shortened or
extended by mutual consent of the Union and Corporation.
The expense of the arbitrator shall be shared by the
Corporation and the Union.
The decision of the Arbitrator as to the issue and the award
shall be final and binding on the parties, consistent with the
provisions of Civil Practice Laws and Regulations, Article 75.
The Arbitrator shall have no power to add to, subtract from or

change any of the provisions of this Agreement, nor to render
any decision which conflicts with a law, regulation, directive
or ordinance. Awards may not be retroactive beyond the date
the grievance was filed or beyond the date the employee
became aware of the grievance, except when a grievance is
filed concerning back pay earned but not received.

POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES
EMPLOYER
The credible evidence establishes beyond any doubt that Grievant is guilty of
recurring acts of misconduct, insubordination, inadequate performance and incompetence
as charged in the NODs. Grievant's termination is reasonable and proper because she is
unable and unwilling to perform the duties of her pivotal Grade 13 position as a Senior
Administrative Aide or even the duties of an entry level Administrative Aide position.
The Grievant has been repeatedly warned, counseled and once previously disciplined, yet
her unacceptable behavior and attitude continues. Grievant has failed and refused to
follow directives or established office procedures or to work cooperatively with others.
All of Grievant's supervisors have been unable to improve her performance and attitude.
For many years, and despite many efforts to correct her behavior by counseling, warnings
and lesser disciplinary action, Grievant has been an openly hostile, incorrigible employee
who is incapable or unwilling to change her persistent pattern of misconduct and
unacceptable work ethic and habits. Grievant's work since the 1990's is riddled with
deficiencies which she refuses to acknowledge. Grievant refuses to take responsibility
for her actions. Rather, she blames others within and without HRI for sabotaging her and
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invading her work environment. The decisions to suspend and terminate Grievant were
reasonable and appropriate and not unjust, arbitrary or capricious. HRI's decision to
terminate was reached only after a substantial effort to rehabilitate the Grievant had failed
and after a thorough investigation involving many persons, including the Grievant, had
been conducted.
Grievant's suspension before temrination was appropriate because there was
probable cause for HRI to believe that Grievant's continued presence on the job would
severely interfere with its operations. Her continued presence on the job would have
jeopardized HRI's efficiency, corporate reputation and operations.
The substantive grounds for suspension and ultimate discharge are compelling and
there are no procedural errors or deficiencies which would warrant or require the
arbitrator to dismiss any of the NODs or substitute a lesser penalty. Since Grievant has
not been a competent, cooperative, productive employee and cannot be made into one,
there is no viable option but to terminate the Grievant and to uphold her suspension
without pay.

UNION
The second and third NODs must be dismissed because those charges were
brought against Grievant without her first being afforded any opportunity to offer a
defense. HRI unfairly concluded that Grievant was guilty before it ever charged her.
This violated Grievant's due process rights. Although Grievant was interviewed before
the first NOD was issued, the subject of that interview is unclear and it addressed, at
most, only a few of the 35 charges in that NOD. Therefore, just as the second and third

NODs must be dismissed, the majority of the charges in the first NOD, about which the
Grievant was not questioned, must also be dismissed. Even if Grievant were found guilty
on the few of the charges in the first NOD about which she was questioned, that finding
would not support her suspension or discharge as those charges involve only minor
clerical errors over a period of approximately 34 months. Moreover, since the suspension
did not occur until the third NOD issued, and as that third NOD must be dismissed
because Grievant was denied basic due process rights, the suspension accompanying that
third NOD also violated the Agreement.
The Employer's witnesses are not credible because they testified to events that
allegedly occurred on dates when Grievant was not at work. The Employer has
stockpiled minor incidents over many years to justify what is otherwise unjust, arbitrary
and capricious action. Grievant has not refused assignments and her written and verbal
responses to inquiries and directives from her supervisors were not inappropriate. The
Employer has taken minor incidents and artificially escalated them because it is "out to
get her." Grievant, however, has a reasonable explanation for all of her actions and has
acted as any reasonable person would have under the circumstances. The charges against
Grievant should, therefore, be dismissed as unjust, arbitrary and capricious and Grievant
should be reinstated with full back pay and benefits.

BACKGROUND FACTS
HRI is a private not-for-profit corporation which obtains and manages millions of
dollars in grants for public health initiatives. As a grants management organization, HRI
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is accountable to its funding sources. As relevant, HRI assists the New York State
Department of Health (State DOH) to develop and deliver public health care.
The Aids Institute is a center within the State DOH funded in substantial part with
grants procured by HRI. Its mission is to provide a coordinated response to the AIDS
epidemic within New York State. The Women's Services Unit (WSU) is one of six
operating units with the Bureau of Special Populations which itself is within the
Institute's Division of HIV Prevention. The WSU funds and monitors efforts to prevent
children and newborns from becoming infected with the HIV virus or AIDS and
treatment after infection.
The WSU, using seven contract managers, oversees 60 to 70 contracts with
community-based organizations and hospitals which provide AIDS and HIV-related
services to women and their families including pre-natal and post-natal care and
counseling regarding HIV, AIDS and sexually transmitted diseases. The unit functions
under a heavy workload that is time and issue sensitive, particularly as to fiscal
monitoring and management.
GRIEV ANT'S WORK HISTORY
Grievant began working at the AIDS institute in September 1991 as a Senior
Secretary in the Bureau of Community Based Services. In February 1992, Grievant
transferred into the OB/GYN unit (the precursor to WSU) as an Administrative Aide. At
the time of her suspension Grievant was a Grade 13 Administrative Aide in WSU, a
position designed to function as a bridge between professional and support staff and to
serve as liaison with those who fund and use the Unit's services. Her duties include
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serving as the contact person for persons who deal with the WSU, arranging meetings,
creating and maintaining unit files, mail collection and distribution, photocopying and
related administrative services.
WITNESSES
HRI offered the testimony of the following witnesses on its direct and rebuttal
case.
1. Barbara Agatstein, Assistant Director, AIDS Institute, Bureau of Special
Populations, Division of HIV Prevention.
2. Carol Bailey, Assistant Director for Human Resources, HRI.
3. Janice Bigler, Program Manager-Contract Manager, AIDS Institute,
Adolescent Prevention Services Unit.
4.

Cathy Gonzalves-Ashworth, Assistant Director, AIDS Institute, WSU.

5.

Sharon Hecht, Heath Administrator/Contract Manager, AIDS Institute, WSU.

6. Jean Holder, Senior Program Coordinator, WSU and formerly in Adolescent
Prevention Services, AIDS Institute.
7. Ivan Kazen, Public Health Representative/Contract Manager, WSU.
8. Lavinia Morrison, Director of Administration, Metropolitan Area Regional
Office of the AIDS Institute.
9

Ramlochand Singh, Grievant's immediate supervisor from 1996-September

1998 as Public Health Representative II, Aides Institute, WSU (12-89 to 9-98).

10. Roberta Stewart, Director of WSU.
11. Dolores Wilson, Corporate Director of Human Resources, HRI.
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12. Robert Morris, Administrative Aide, Administration and Contract
Management, AIDS Institute.
13. John Taranto, Public Health Representative Ill/Contract Administrator, WSU.
14. Lorraine Vollmer, Secretary 1, Grade 11, Adolescent Prevention Services,
AIDS Institute.
For convenience, my references to supervisors in my findings and opinion, infra.
are to Grievant's immediate supervisors and persons in higher authority.
The Grievant was CSEA's only witness.
MOTION TO DISMISS
Before the merits of the Employer's allegations can be considered, it is necessary
to decide whether the merits are even reviewable. The Union argues that most of the
allegations under the first NOD, and all of those under the second and third NODs, must
be dismissed because the Grievant was not interviewed by the Employer before she was
subjected to disciplinary charges. The Union argues that denying the Grievant an
opportunity to tell her stoiy before any charges were filed denied her fundamental due
process which necessitates dismissal of all but a few of the charges.
The Union's argument that a pre-charge interview with the Grievant is an absolute
requirement of due process is overstated. Even the relatively few arbitrators who adhere
to a view that due process necessitates a pre-charge investigation that includes an
interview with the employee do not view the requirement to be absolute. There is a
substantial body of arbitral precedent holding that a failure to interview an employee
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before disciplinary charges are filed can be excused under a variety of circumstances
such as where the grievant is not prejudiced as a result. Those circumstances are present
here. There is no reasonable dispute as to the facts regarding many of the allegations
against the Grievant. Those facts that are disputed hinge ultimately on credibility
resolutions such that the Employer would surely have sided with its managers and
supervisors notwithstanding any denials the Grievant might have made in a pre-charge
interview. Moreover, the limited interview the Employer held with the Grievant before
the first NOD revealed clearly that the Grievant believed that she had not engaged in any
acts of misconduct or incompetency. There is no reasonable reason to believe that
Grievant's position would have changed with respect to other allegations of the same
general type. For a combination of those reasons, additional interviews with the Grievant
would have been futile.
In any event, I have regularly held in accordance with what I believe to be the
clear majority rule, that disciplinary charges are not subject to dismissal simply on the
ground that a grievant was not afforded the opportunity for a pre-charge interview unless,
perhaps, the contract requires such an interview. These parties' agreement does not
address a requirement for a pre-charge interview. Due process is not denied an
employee, in my opinion, simply because disciplinary charges are brought against that
employee without benefit of a pre-charge interview. The employer always bears the
burden of poof as to guilt on any allegation. Indeed, these parties' agreement states
specifically in § 14.3 that an employee is innocent until proven guilty. An employer's
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failure to investigate its allegations prior to bringing charges only redounds to its
detriment if it fails as a result to sustain its burden of proof.
This Grievant had an unfettered ability to defend herself against these charges in
the context of the contractual processes which define her due process rights as they affect
her employment and she did so. To the extent there was a failure by the Employer to
interview the Grievant before it issued her the NODs, that failure did not prejudice her
ability to defend herself. Therefore, the absence of a pre-charge investigation is not a
ground for the dismissal of the charges.
Arnold Zack has recently commented in Arbitrating Discipline and Discharge
Cases, (LRP Publications, 2000) on the investigation requirements under the seven tests
of just cause developed by Arbitrator Daugherty, upon which the Union relies. I quote
the following excerpt from pages 21 through 23 of Arbitrator Zack's comments because
they reflect my own views on the subject.
[M]ost arbitrators take the position that while it is wise for
the employer to conduct an investigation to assure that
discipline was well founded and to avoid it being overturned
by the arbitrator, that is the employer's option rather than any
requirement of due process. Due process is better satisfied by
the confrontation of the parties at the arbitration hearing than
by reliance on any substitute created and run by the employer.
[I]n non-railroad arbitration where the arbitrator replaces the
supervisor in holding the hearing, reliance on those seven
tests is misplaced, particularly tests three, four and
five.. .requiring a fair investigatory hearing before the case
comes to arbitration. Railroad arbitration is an appellate
procedure, while non-railroad arbitration is considered as ade
novo hearing on the issues. Given the role of the arbitrator in
the hearing of non-railroad arbitration, the seven tests have
historical interest but hardly rise to the level of an essential
prerequisite to a finding of just cause. They have provided a
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misleading diversion, particularly for unions, which
pointlessly claim the employer has to provide an in-house
investigation before being able to impose discipline.
Daugherty's requirement of such a hearing made sense in
railroads where there was no adversarial hearing before an
arbitrator. But they are anachronistic in current labormanagement relations where arbitrators rather than employers
conduct the hearings. Employers are wise to conduct interval
investigations or at least to give accused employees the
opportunity to respond to charges, but the fact that they do
not and risk going to arbitration without investigation is at
their peril. But their failure to conduct an investigation does
not detract from their right to discipline or create reversible
error when the case comes to arbitration.
FINDINGS ON NOTICES OF DISCIPLINE
Set forth below are the charges as filed and a brief discussion of my disposition of
each. In reaching my findings, I have carefully considered all of the record evidence and
the parties' arguments as to each separate charge. I have, however, avoided a lengthy
description of the evidence submitted by the parties in making my findings. The record is
voluminous and even a summary recitation of the record evidence, both testimonial and
documentary, would produce an unnecessarily long opinion and award.
FIRST NOD
Charge 1
On September 9, 1996 you were insubordinate and
engaged in misconduct when at first you refused to attend
a mandatory meeting, and then you were disruptive and
rebellious at the meeting. You refused to accept a copy of
an office protocol that was developed for your position
and your supervisor had to take the protocol from the
department head and place it in front of you. During the
meeting while the protocol was being reviewed, you never
even opened it. When you were asked questions during
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the meeting about your understanding of the protocol, you
insolently answered "whatever". Management cannot be
expected to run an efficient operation when you are so
contentious and uncooperative.
The puipose of the meeting held on September 9, 1996 was to discuss a written
office "Protocol." The Protocol was developed to give the Grievant and a member of the
support staff with whom Grievant worked written instructions regarding the Employer's
expectations as to their job performance and their relationships with one another and staff
while at work. Grievant initially refused to attend the meeting because she claimed she
was afraid of the co-worker who would also be attending the meeting. Grievant relented
when she was informed that she would be disciplined if she did not attend the meeting.
Despite Grievant's denials, I find that Grievant did not read the Protocol and that her
behavior at the meeting was otherwise uncooperative and unprofessional as marked, for
example, by her "whatever" responses to questions asked of her during the meeting.
Moreover, I find that Grievant's stated reason for initially refusing to attend the meeting
was merely a pretext offered by her to disguise what was the real reason, that reason
being a simple unwillingness to attend a meeting to discuss her misbehavior and poor job
performance.
The allegations of insubordination and misconduct under this charge are sustained.
Charge 2
On September 19,1996 you were insubordinate, engaged
in misconduct, and failed to perform adequately when you
responded to a PROFS note from your unit Director in a
very insolent and unprofessional manner. You were sent a
note by Roberta Stewart in which she summarized issues
discussed at a counseling session held the previous day.
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Instead of simply acknowledging that you understood her
issues and would endeavor to improve, you stated" ....'I
DO NOT WISH TO GO INTO THE CLOSET' so please
stop sabotaging my position." And further stated "other
than that I have no problem." and then stated "Thank
you and have a Nice Day!!"
The supervisor's note concerned complaints regarding Grievant's telephone
etiquette, her impermissible use of the telephone for personal business, and the office
Protocol. Grievant was asked to respond if she did not agree with the comments in the
supervisor's note or "if you would like to add anything that may have been left out."
Grievant responded as follows:
Hi Roberta: I am asking for peace to do my job as
professionally as possible without any grievance against
colleague. As mentioned from the start of my employment
here on numerous occasion "I DO NOT WISH TO GO INTO
THE CLOSET" so please stop sabotaging my position. I also
do not wish to socialize with anyone that has caused me
bodily and emotional harm other than on a professional basis
and I ask that this be respected. PLEASE. Other than that I
have no problem. Thank you and HAVE A NICE DAY.
I find Grievant's response to her supervisor's memo to be wholly unresponsive,
unprofessional and disrespectful. The "CLOSET" reference is incomprehensible, as well
as crude, and certainly irrelevant to anything asked of her by the supervisor.
The allegations of insubordination, misconduct and inadequate performance under
this charge are sustained.
Charge 3
On or about September 21,1996, you were insubordinate,
engaged in misconduct and failed to perform adequately
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when you went on vacation and failed to provide a copy of
the Women's Services schedule to the other secretary in
the office as specified in secretarial protocol.
Under the Protocol, Grievant was required to give a copy of the WSU schedule to
the secretary who worked next to the Grievant. The Employer alleges that a copy was
not given directly to the secretary as required under the Protocol. Grievant testified that
she prepared the schedule and "cc'd" it to everyone in the unit and posted it.
The evidence in support of this charge is insufficient to establish insubordination,
misconduct, inadequate performance or incompetence. Grievant may reasonably have
believed that personal delivery of the schedule to the secretary was not necessary so long
as it was otherwise distributed and posted throughout the unit.
The allegations of insubordination, misconduct and inadequate performance under
this charge are dismissed.
Charge 4
In December 1996 you were given an assignment to make
up folders for all of the providers so that the new year's
CFA's may be filed properly and would be available for
access for those that needed to work with them. You were
insubordinate and failed to perform adequately in doing
this simple task when you still had not completed the
folders by March 11,1997. This failure to complete a
simple assignment prompted a program manager to
complain. When you did finally complete the folders,
which wasn't until June 1997 , you had not put them in
alphabetical order so that the staff could efficiently access
them, and you had typed many of the labels of the folders
incorrectly. You had more than adequate time to complete
this task, since program managers are reluctant to give
you any work due to your continual inadequate
performance. This task was also one which was suitable
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for a clerical employee far below your level and should
have been easy for you to complete.
The assignment to prepare file folders given the Grievant in late December 1996
was not completed until June 1997. When completed, the file folders were not
alphabetized and were not placed in order in file boxes.
The task assigned was well within Grievant's job duties. The time taken to
complete the task was unreasonably long and the work as done was deficient. Grievant
knew the files had to be in alphabetical order to be of use to the unit. Contrary to the
Protocol, Grievant failed to notify her supervisors of an inability to complete the
assignment in a timely manner.
The allegations of inadequate performance under this charge are sustained. The
allegations of insubordination under this charge are dismissed.
Charge 5
On or about January 15, 1997 you failed to perform
adequately and were incompetent when you failed to
correctly copy a DOHM memorandum regarding
Newborn Screening, copying only the odd numbered
pages. You failed to inform a memo recipient of the
problem or to supply them with the corrected packet thus
causing them to miss an important meeting in order to
take the time to review the corrected packet. Copying
documents is a simple task. It is expected that any of the
support staff be able to copy materials correctly,
especially for staff at your high level.

Grievant copied only the odd-numbered pages of a document. Although she
corrected the mistake when it was brought to her attention, she did not notify one
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employee who had received the miscopied document. That employee did not discover
that she did not have a complete document until she had left work and she did not receive
a corrected copy until the next morning. The employee skipped a morning meeting so
she could review the copied document in time for the afternoon meeting.
There are two aspects to this charge. As to the miscopying itself, Grievant as a
grade 13 Administrative Aide can reasonably be expected to copy documents correctly
and to verify that they have been copied correctly. Although mistakes do happen,
Grievant should have examined the documents to ensure that the entire document was
copied before it was distributed to staff. The second aspect is the failure to notify an
employee of the mistake. All but one employee received corrected copies of the
document in a timely fashion after the mistake was brought to Grievant's attention.
Whether the one employee who had gone home earlier could have been contacted that
day by the Grievant is unclear. Therefore, Grievant's failure to notify that employee
prior to the next day of work cannot reasonably be regarded as incompetency or
misconduct.
The allegations of inadequate performance and incompetency under this charge
are sustained to the extent noted and otherwise dismissed.
Charge 6
On or about January 15,1997 you were insubordinate,
and performed inadequately when you failed to deliver a
fax to Roberta Stewart's desk. You were told by one of the
contract managers to pick up the CFA Flow Chart that
was faxed to the NYC office and put it on Roberta
Stewart's desk. You failed to follow this directive.
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I find that Grievant was asked, by the contract manager who sent it, to obtain the
fax and deliver it to Stewart and that she failed to do so without explanation.
The allegations of insubordination and inadequate performance under this charge
are sustained.
Charge 7
On January 16,1997 you were incompetent and failed to
perform adequately when you telephoned a secretary in
the Albany office of another unit, that at times provides
support services for the Albany WSU staff, about
resending a fax that you questioned had been sent to your
office by staff. You asked her to hang on the phone while
you checked to see if it had been received, and then never
again picked up the phone, nor did you call her back to let
her know if you had received the fax.
This charge is related to Charge 6.
An employee working in Albany spoke by telephone with the Grievant on January
16, 1997 to verify that the fax transmission in charge 6 had been received. Grievant told
the Albany employee that she would check, but Grievant never came back to the phone
after ten minutes and she did not telephone the Albany employee to inform her as to
whether the fax had been received.
Grievant offered no explanation for her conduct as she did not recall it. As
Grievant knew that confirmation of receipt was important, her failure to confirm receipt
of the fax or acknowledge nonreceipt was inappropriate.
The allegations of incompetency and inadequate performance under this charge
are sustained.
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Charge 8
On Friday, January 31,1997 you were insubordinate,
failed to perform adequately and were incompetent when
you failed to reserve a room and the good conference
phone, as you had been directed, for a meeting/conference
call to be held that following Monday. You confirmed the
time and place with your supervisor but later informed
him that you had indeed failed to perform this simple task
adequately. You further demonstrated your incompetence
and poor attitude when you were questioned about the
error in a PROFS note and stated to your department
head "But, according to the schedule there still should not
have been a problem with the Director's Office or
Conference Phone because they were both free at 2:00 p."
Yet you had told your supervisor that the meeting was set
for 3:00 p.m. - 4:00 p.m., not 2:00 p.m. as specified in your
insolent and uncooperative response.
Grievant failed to reserve a room with a conference telephone as directed, despite
her representation to a supervisor that she had done as requested. Although a meeting
room happened to be available, the conference phone was in use by others, A regular
office phone limited to use by one person at a time had to be substituted, which was not
suitable for the conduct of the conference involving sixteen people. Grievant admitted
her error in a response to the supervisor, but she also expressed a belief that there should
not have been a "problem" because the schedule did not show the room or the conference
phone having been previously booked. This mitigation defense was not appropriate
because it did not address Grievant's failure to do the scheduling as requested.
The allegations of insubordination, inadequate performance and incompetency
under this charge are sustained.
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Charge 9
On or about February 28,1997 you engaged in
misconduct when you worked on your school work in the
office during work time without authorization. You also
engaged in misconduct when you falsified your timesheet
by failing to record this personal work during business
hours. You have been seen on several other occasions by
several other employees doing work that is not related to
assignments given to you at the office.

This charge rests on Grievant's statement to a supervisor that she "was glad she
had her homework" when most of the office staff was away from the office at a statewide
conference because the office had been quiet,
The Employer contends that the logical and reasonable inference to be drawn from
this statement is an admission by the Grievant that she, in fact, worked on her
"homework" during working hours without charging that time on her timesheet.
Apart from this statement, there is insufficient evidence establishing either that
Grievant in fact was doing wholly personal work on company time or, if so, the amount
of time she spent doing that personal work.
The allegations under this charge are dismissed for failure of proof.
Charge 10
On or about March 7, 1997 you were insubordinate and
failed to perform adequately' when you faxed a CFA
cover sheet to a WSU contract manager after being told
not to fax it to him because he was trying to fax material
out. He told you to put the material in the mail.
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Grievant had a document that required review by a contract manager in Albany.
She called the manager who instructed her to put it in the mail. Grievant then said she
would fax it, but she was told by the manager not to do so because the manager was
trying to fax something else out and the unit that owned the fax machine had material
being faxed in.
I find that Grievant failed to abide by the manager's instructions. Even if she was
well intentioned, and even if the reasons for the manager not wanting the document faxed
were not explained to her, Grievant should have mailed the document as instructed and
she should not have disobeyed that directive.
The allegations of insubordination and inadequate performance under this charge
are sustained.
Charge 11
On Tuesday, March 18,1997 you engaged in misconduct,
failed to perform adequately, and were incompetent, when
you failed on that day to call members of the PPG
Women's Committee regarding a conference call
scheduled for the next day. You had been informed in the
past that work for this committee takes priority over
other work. Yet when the Program Manager asked you on
Wednesday morning as to how many people would be on
the call, your response was "I'm getting ready to do that
now". You were incompetent and performed inadequately
when you sent a fax reminding members of the conference
call and specified the time for the call to be 1:30 - 3:00
p.m., and then told some members by phone that the call
was to take place at 1:00 p.m., a half hour earlier. This led
to confusion and some lateness with members connecting
to the multiparty conference call. This also wasted
valuable staff member time waiting for all parties to
connect.
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Grievant was instructed on March 18, 1997 to schedule a conference call for
March 19, 1997 at 1:30 p.m.
She did not schedule the conference call until the morning of the next day.
Although Grievant faxed Committee members information about the conference call on
March 18, she did not, contrary to instruction and established procedure, call the
Committee members on the 18th. When Grievant contacted the Committee members by
phone on the March 19, she told them incorrectly that the conference was at 1:00 p.m.
instead of the correct time of 1:30 p.m. As a result of these mistakes, the conference call
was disorganized and confused.
The allegations of inadequate performance and incompetency under this charge
are sustained, but the misconduct allegations are dismissed.
Charge 12
On Friday, March 28, 1997 you were insubordinate,
engaged in misconduct and failed to perform adequately
when you did not answer staff member's phones when
your unit Director, Roberta Stewart called them at about
9:15 am. Their phones were not answered after many
rings. The unit Director then called your line and you
answered. You have been directed innumerable times that
you are to answer the phones of your unit promptly and
courteously. You are well within range to hear staff
phones and you can see when their lines light up on your
call board.
It is the Grievant's responsibility to answer telephone calls that come into the
WSU. Grievant admits this, but she claims to have been away from her desk when the
calls were made to two separate lines which were allowed to ring and ring for a
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substantial period of time. These phones are near Grievant's desk. When the phones
were not answered, the caller dialed the Grievant's line, which Grievant answered
immediately. When asked why she had not answered the other lines, Grievant claimed
that she did not hear the phones ringing.
I do not find the Grievant's explanation credible. All the phones are in a small
area. The calls appeal" to have been made consecutively and within a veiy short period of
time. It is not reasonable to believe that Grievant was in a location that prevented her
from answering either of the first two calls, but that she was back at her desk immediately
thereafter so that she could answer her own phone. The reasonable conclusion to be
drawn from the entirety of a record that evidences many prior complaints about
Grievant's not answering other staff members' phones is that she heard those phones
ringing, but simply failed to answer the calls because she did not want to.
The allegations of insubordination, misconduct and inadequate performance under
this charge are sustained.
Charge 13
On or about Friday, March 28,1997 you were
insubordinate, engaged in misconduct, performed
inadequately and were incompetent when you failed to
send a copy of a report given to you by your unit Director,
to the updated address of Albany WSU staff. He had
previously sent all unit members, including you, a PROFS
note informing all of his new address. You failed to
perform this very basic secretarial task of keeping files
updated. Further, you lied to your Director when you told
her that you had mailed out the report in the morning and
did not know if it could be retrieved for correction. In fact
the report was still in the mailroom at 5:00 p.m. when
your Director checked there. If the report had been sent
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in the morning, as you stated, then it would have gone out
with the 3:00 p.m. pickup.
Grievant sent the staff member a mailing to his prior address on March 28, 1997
despite his having previously notified the unit of his address change by PROFS note.
Grievant did not record the change of address. When asked by her supervisor to retrieve
the letter with the wrong address from the mail room, Grievant told her supervisor it had
already gone out from the mailroom. However, when the supervisor went to the mail
room at approximately 5:00 p.m., the letter was still there as originally prepared with the
incorrect address.
Grievant failed to properly maintain records as is her responsibility and then
seriously compounded that mistake by lying to her supervisor. The presence of the letter
with the incorrect address in the mailroom at 5:00 p.m. proves at least reasonably, if not
conclusively, that Grievant never complied with her supervisor's instruction to attempt to
retrieve the letter with the incorrect address.
The allegations of insubordination, misconduct, inadequate performance and
incompetency under this charge are sustained.
Charge 14
On April 22,1997 you requested three days of personal
leave. Once she had reviewed your attendance and the
workload status, your department head responded to your
request with a denial on April 29,1997. On April 29, you
responded to the request denial by stating that your trip
was canceled and you forgot to revoke your request. You
failed to perform adequately by wasting the department
head's time unnecessarily.
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Grievant on April 22, 1997 requested personal leave, but sometime after the
request was made and before the request was denied on April 29, 1997, her plans
changed such that she no longer needed the personal time.
The Employer claims that Grievant should have notified her supervisor so that the
supervisor's time was not wasted considering a request for time that was no longer
wanted.
It appears that Grievant's plans changed shortly before the request was denied, but
still at a point that permitted her to notify her supervisor that she did not want the leave.
There is, however, insufficient evidence that the Employer has a clearly communicated
policy requiring an employee to always notify a supervisor of a request to cancel a prior
request for leave. In the absence of such a policy, and as Grievant's failure to notify may
not have been willful, I do not find the Grievant guilty of this charge.
The allegations of inadequate performance under this charge are dismissed.
Charge 15
On April 29,1997 you were insubordinate, engaged in
misconduct, and failed to perform adequately when you
refused to assist a new employee with a task and refused
to even answer her questions regarding a format that she
was to use on a project. Through your attitude and
behavior you jeopardize efficient office operations,
alienate staff, and augment counter productivity.
The proof of this charge consists of one supervisor's testimony about what another
supervisor had told her. Grievant testified that she did try to help the other employee
who did not understand what the Grievant was telling her.
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The allegations of insubordination, misconduct and inadequate performance under
this charge are dismissed for failure of proof.
Charge 16
On April 29,1997 you were insubordinate, engaged in
misconduct and performed inadequately when first of all,
you failed to transmit a phone message to your
department head. This failure caused her embarrassment
when she saw the caller who asked why she had not
returned any of her messages. Secondly, instead of
acknowledging the department head's instructions on
proper phone procedures, you sent her a note denying the
transgression and ended the note insolently with
"Regards!".
Several calls were made to the Grievant's supervisor the week before April 29,
1997. When the caller happened to meet the unit supervisor, she expressed surprise that
her calls were not returned. The caller told the supervisor that she had spoken with the
Grievant. After the supervisor explained to the caller that she had not received any
messages, the supervisor sent the Grievant a written note detailing what she expected the
Grievant to do when taking a telephone message. Grievant responded to the supervisor
with a note denying knowledge about this incident which she closed with "Regards."
The nature of the conversation between the caller and the supervisor is persuasive
that the calls were placed and received by the Grievant, yet no messages were recorded.
This was a failure to perform as expected and as previously directed, an error again
compounded both by the Grievant's refusal to acknowledge the supervisor's instructions
regarding basic telephone technique and etiquette and her statement to her supervisor that
she knew nothing about the situation.
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The allegations of insubordination, misconduct and inadequate performance
under this charge are sustained.
Charge 17
On or about May 1,1997 you engaged in misconduct and
failed to perform adequately when you either threw out or
misplaced a stack of files of the Women's Service's unit
that were in the reception area. You first brought these
files to your department head's attention, and later denied
knowledge of them stating that there were only books and
bound documents.
Grievant notified her supervisor that there were files and documents in a reception
area that was being cleaned. Grievant's supervisor told her to label them for filing. The
files were missing the next day and Grievant denies knowledge as to what happened to
them. Moreover, Grievant claims that the materials were not files, only books and
documents.
I credit the Employer's witnesses that the materials included files and that the
Grievant was instructed to file them. Grievant ignored the instruction and the materials
were apparently discarded during the cleanup.
Grievant has responsibility for maintenance of files and other materials and she
should have taken steps to file or otherwise safeguard them, particularly because she was
the person who first brought those files and/or documents to her supervisor's attention.
The allegations of misconduct and inadequate performance under this charge are
sustained.
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Charge 18
On May 9,1997 you engaged in misconduct and failed to
perform adequately when you failed to be helpful to one
of the managerial staff in their efforts to determine the
whereabouts of one of the program managers. You did
not hang up on a personal phone call but instead
answered the manager in an annoyed tone and responded
"that's not my unit!".
The Director of another unit in the AIDS Institute had been notified at work that
her elderly neighbor had fallen and that authorities were inquiring of the Director whether
she had a key to the apartment that they could use to gain entry. The Director went to
find her supervisor to notify him that she had to leave work, but could not find him. The
Director spoke with Grievant who was then on the phone. Grievant told the Director she
did not know where the other supervisor was, that he might have been in a meeting, but
she did not know where because "it was not [the Grievant's] unit."
It is the Grievant's failure to assist a unit Director with an emergency situation that
is the basis for this charge. The Employer expected the Grievant to place the caller on
hold and assist the unit Director.
Although the Employer suspects that the Grievant was on a personal call, there is
no proof of this. Nor was Grievant requested to end her call. Although Grievant might
have been more helpful, her actions are not themselves a reasonable basis for discipline
for either incompetence or misconduct.
The allegations of misconduct and inadequate performance under this charge are
dismissed.
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Charge 19
On or about May 30,1997 you were insubordinate, and
performed inadequately when you did not follow your
department head's previous directive to prepare
individual employee envelopes for staff paychecks.
Additionally, your department head gave you instructions
on what to do with your desk key to cover accessing files
in your locked desk when you are away. You engaged in
misconduct when you told her in a PROFS note that
"Lavinia has keys to everyone's desk..." instead of
complying with her directive of how to handle the key.
Grievant had been told on several occasions to place paychecks in envelopes to
preserve the employee's confidentiality. On or about May 30, 1997, she disobeyed this
directive. The PROFS note sent that date was not the first notice to Grievant as to the
manner of paycheck distribution. Rather, it was another reminder of instructions
previously given to her. Grievant's claim that the PROFS note was her first notice about
the distribution of paychecks is not credited.
Grievant was requested in mat same PROFS note to notify her supervisor as to
where the Grievant kept a key to her desk so that it could be opened as needed in
Grievant's absence. Grievant responded that another employee had a copy of her key.
This was not responsive to the supervisor's inquiry. The supervisor wanted to know
where the Grievant kept her key, not who else had a copy of it. Grievant knew or should
have known that her comment was not the information the supervisor wanted.
The allegations of insubordination and inadequate performance under this charge
are sustained.

33

Charge 20
On May 30, June 2, and June 3,1997 you were
insubordinate and failed to perform adequately when in
reporting your absence from work, you did not speak to
your supervisor. You have been told on numerous
occasions that you are to speak only with your supervisor
or someone in his chain of command when you are going
to be absent from work.
Grievant's absences from work are to be reported to her immediate supervisor or
someone in higher authority. Grievant knew this because she had been told this many
times. On the dates alleged, absences were reported to others. That was not in
compliance with the directions given her. Grievant claims that she usually calls her
supervisor when absent, but there is no evidence to support this. Nor is any explanation
offered as to why supervisory personnel were not contacted on the dates in question.
Indeed, it appears clearly that Grievant regularly calls in to work on or before 8:30 a.m.
knowing that supervisory personnel are not in at that hour in an effort to avoid speaking
with her supervisors.
The allegations of insubordination and inadequate performance under this charge
are sustained.
Charge 21
On June 3, 1997 you engaged in misconduct and failed to
perform adequately when you failed to check your in-box
until approximately 4:00 p.m. instead of in the morning.
Your department head had left a fax for you in your in
box the previous night so that you could fax the document
first thing in the morning. You never faxed it until late
that afternoon. When your department head reminded
you to always use a fax cover sheet when faxing
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documents, you looked at her with disdain instead of
replying that you would cooperate with her directive.
The charge references the date of June 3, 1997. The Union alleges that this is
incorrect because Grievant was not at work that day. I find that any error as to date is
inconsequential there being no prejudice to Grievant because the conduct occurred on or
about that date.
Materials to be faxed the next day were left on Grievant's desk the evening before.
Grievant did not fax the material until 4:00 p.m. because she had not checked her inbox
until shortly before she faxed the material. As prepared by the Grievant the fax was to
be sent without a cover sheet. Grievant's supervisor saw Grievant preparing a "post-it"
note to serve as a cover sheet and instructed her to send a cover sheet. Grievant
complied, but allegedly looked at the supervisor with "disdain" and made an inquiry as to
whether there had to be a cover sheet even for the intended recipient.
I dismiss this specification. There is no indication that Grievant was told that the
fax had to be sent first thing in the morning. Without priority assignment, completion of
the task on the next business day is timely and cannot be regarded as incompetency or
misconduct. Similarly a "look" and an inquiry cannot form the basis for discipline as the
first is wholly subjective and the latter is appropriate to clarify the current policy
regarding use of cover sheets.
The allegations of misconduct and inadequate performance under this charge are
dismissed.
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Charge 22
On June 12,1997 at approximately 9:30 a.m. you were
given an assignment to make a hanging and a file folder.
You were insubordinate, engaged in misconduct and
failed to perform adequately when you ignored the
assignment and didn't complete it until almost two
months later on August 5. You were insubordinate,
engaged in misconduct and failed to perform adequately
when you did not notify your supervisor of your inability
to complete this assignment in a timely fashion as
specified in the office protocol given to you in September
1996.
A June 12, 1997 assignment to create a file folder was not completed until August
5, 1997. Task completion should have taken 10-15 minutes. The delay was not
explained by the Grievant because she testified that she was not given the assignment.
I credit the Employer's witnesses that the assignment was given to the Grievant.
Contrary to this and previous instructions, the task was not completed in a timely fashion
without notification to supervisors of an inability to perform.
The allegations of insubordination, misconduct and inadequate performance under
this charge are dismissed.
Charge 23
On or about June 18,1997 you failed to perform
adequately when you sent an employee's timesheet to
central records without first checking to insure that the
supervisor had signed it as required. You engaged in
misconduct when you gave the employee a copy of the
unsigned timesheet but told him that the copies that were
sent to time records had been signed.
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Grievant sent a timesheet to Albany without the required supervisor's signature
despite having made assurances to the employee to the contrary. The employee's
timesheet was returned for signature by the supervisor.
Although the employee appears not to have been prejudiced by the initial absence
of the supervisor's signature, it is Grievant's responsibility to ensure that timesheets are
signed by all necessaiy parties before they are sent to Albany. Grievant knew this but did
not act accordingly.
Any inaccuracy as to the date of this occurrence is again inconsequential given
that the record shows that it was Grievant who assured the employee that the timesheet
sent to Albany had or would have the supervisor's signature.
The allegations of inadequate performance under this charge are sustained. The
misconduct allegations are dismissed.
Charge 24
On June 20,1997 were given a document to copy and
distribute from your department head to the WSU staff.
You were incompetent and failed to perform adequately
when you did not distribute copies to those who were
cc'ed. You were also incompetent and failed to perform
adequately when you copied only one side of pages that
were two sided. Copying documents is a minor task that
even an entry level employee would be expected to
perform in a competent fashion.
I find that Grievant miscopied a document by not copying all of the pages and
failed to distribute copies to all of those who were to receive copies by omitting a director
and deputy director from the distribution.
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The allegations of incompetence and inadequate performance under this charge are
sustained.
Charge 25
On or about June 20,1997 and June 23,1997 you engaged
in misconduct when you used work time and office
equipment to type up the scenario involved in your arrest
of June 17, 1997. You have stated during your
interrogation that you have computers at school and at
home and therefore you have no need to use the computer
at work to type your personal papers. Yet, this scenario
was taken off of your computer at work which would lead
management to believe that you also lied about not doing
your homework while on the job.
Grievant's supervisor observed personal materials on Grievant's computer screen.
He made a copy of it and sent it to his supervisors. Grievant denies doing this work, but I
credit the Employer's witness. Grievant knew not to use employer time and equipment
for personal reasons but did so anyway.
The allegations of misconduct under this charge are sustained.
Charge 26
On August 12,1997 you were incompetent and performed
inadequately when by 4:15 p.m. you had not completed
the assignment given to you at 9:15 a.m. on the previous
day to make copies of a few documents. You had more
than adequate time to complete this assignment but you
instead spent work time on personal phone calls.
An assignment given Grievant to copy a few documents on the morning of August
11 was not completed by late afternoon the next day. Grievant could not recall this
incident, but I credit the Employer witnesses in this regard.
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The assignment could have been completed within an hour, but was not done even
by the late afternoon of the day after the assignment was given. This is not timely
completion of task, a failure caused, at least in part, by Grievant having spent
considerable time engaged in personal telephone calls.
The allegations of incompetence and inadequate performance under this charge are
sustained.
Charge 27
On August 13,1997 your direct supervisor sent you a
PROFS note counseling you on your abuse of personal
phone calls, your inability to complete assignments and
your failure to follow established office protocol. You
were insubordinate and engaged in misconduct when you
answered him via a PROFS note with "I don't know what
you are talking about. Have a nice day!"
This PROFS note is a follow-up to the incident in charge 26. The Employer was
concerned that Grievant was not completing assignments because she was spending
excessive amounts of time on the phone in personal conversations unrelated to work.
Grievant's response was "I don't know what you are talking about. Have a nice
day." This was not responsive. Concern was again being expressed about Grievant's
work habits. The accusations were serious and they warranted an equally thoughtful and
appropriate response.
The allegations of insubordination and misconduct under this charge are sustained.
Charge 28
On August 13, 1997 you failed to pick up the mail for the
WSU and distribute it. This is a daily assignment. Instead
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you spent a large portion of the day on personal phone
calls, an insubordinate act, despite having been told many
times to limit personal times on the phone. You also failed
to inform anyone that the mail for that day was not
distributed. You were insubordinate when you ignored
directives for your daily work routine. You engaged in
misconduct and were insubordinate when you failed to
complete assignments because of being on the phone, and
you failed to perform adequately when you neither picked
up and distributed the mail, nor informed your supervisor
of this omission as specified in the office protocol given to
you in September 1996. Because of your continuing
patterns of poor performance, misconduct and blatant
incompetence staff of the WSU refrain from giving you
many assignments or assignments of a complicated
nature. They have no faith that you will timely complete
them, nor complete them accurately. Therefore, there is
more than enough time in your workday to complete the
basic task of picking up and distributing mail. Instead
your department head picked up the mail on the following
day and distributed it herself.
Grievant did not pick up or distribute mail on or about August 13, 1997 without
notice to supervisors or staff. Instead, a supervisor who saw the mail in the mailroom late
in the day picked it up and distributed it.
Grievant explained that the supervisor agreed to pick up and distribute the mail to
do Grievant a favor because Grievant was not feeling well. Grievant's explanation is not
credited. Instead, the supervisor's testimony that no such conversation occurred with the
Grievant is credited.
Prompt collection and distribution of mail is important to the Grievant's work unit
because many documents requiring quick action are received. Grievant unreasonably
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failed to perform that task, failed to make proper arrangements for collection and
distribution by others and failed to notify supervisors of her inability to perform.
The allegations of insubordination, misconduct and inadequate performance under
this charge are sustained.
Charge 29
In reference to the above incident, your immediate
supervisor asked you to comment on an e-mail note, about
your failure to perform, forwarded from your department
head. You engaged in misconduct and were insubordinate
when you sent the following flippant e-mail rote in return:
"Please inform her that I appreciate her picking up
whatever date mail she is referring to and if ever she
comes to work in pain and on medication, I will gladly
return the favor and will not even put it on PROFS.
Hopefully she will never suffer with sickness or pain.
Regards!"
Grievant's response to her supervisor's inquiry regarding charge 28 is the subject
of this charge. Grievant's response is accurately reflected in the charge as filed.
Grievant's reply was again nonresponsive. Grievant had not picked up the mail
and she had been notified by her supervisor that she should have informed someone that
she could not do the assignment. Grievant's response is merely an ungracious "thank
you" to the supervisor who picked up the mail and an explanation (1 was ill) as to why
she did not do the job herself. There is no acknowledgment of error or explanation about
why others were not informed about her claimed disability.
The allegations of misconduct and insubordination under this charge are sustained.
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Charge 30
On or about September 3,1997, your department head
again had to point out your engagement in misconduct
and failure to perform adequately. Once again, you sent
mail to one of the program managers in Albany that he
had sent to NYC to be filed. You had received instructions
that your immediate supervisor be shown any mail being
sent to the program managers in Albany. Receiving and
properly directing mail are simple tasks that any level
support person should be able to perform without
instruction or oversight. However, once again your
inattentiveness to the quality of your work had caused
delays in completing the assignment and wasted your
department head's time in making corrections.
An employee in Albany sent documents to Grievant with a note that the
documents were to be filed in New York City. Instead, Grievant returned the documents
to Albany.
The allegations of incompetency and inadequate performance under this charge
are sustained.
Charge 31
In reference to the above incident, on September 3,1997
you were insubordinate and engaged in misconduct when
you responded to your department head's directive to
show your immediate supervisor any mail that you are
sending to the program manager in Albany. Part of your
insolent and insubordinate note stated "Anyway, Ram or
even yourself is free to check Ivan's box daily, it's on his
shelf on the right-hand top, marked Ivan's Mail. It's open
to all. I have no problem with Ram investigating mail
being sent to Ivan as he is instructed to do." Additionally,
you failed to perform adequately when you only sent mail
to the program manager on Thursdays or Fridays instead
of as it was received.
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This charge concerns Grievanfs response to a supervisor's directive related to
charge 30. Inaccuracy, if any, as to the date the response was prepared and/or sent is
again inconsequential because the Grievant unquestionably prepared the response.
Grievant's supervisor sent Grievant the following note:
Audrey, once again, you sent it to Ivan (in Albany), the same
mail that he had sent here to be filed in NYC. Both pieces of
mail had notes from Ivan on them indicating that they would
be placed on his desk for filing. Starting immediately, you
must show Ramlochand the items that you are sending to Ivan
before they are mailed. We are wasting valuable time
sending items back and forth to Albany, without looking at
the documents first to make sure they need to be sent to Ivan
or if they belong in WSU at 5 Penn. We had brought this to
your attention when it happened the first time and asked for
your suggestions on handling Ivan's mail and how we could
prevent this from happening again. As you did not respond to
Ran's note requesting your input in correcting the situation,
we must follow the process outlined above.
Thank you.
Grievant's response was as follows:
Hi Roberta.
I don't know what you were talking about! The only mail I
send to Ivan is basically mail from you and his copy of the
employee time sheet. If anything else is indeed being sent to
Ivan that he sent for his desk, I think I have common sense
not to send it back to him without questioning my especially
if there is a note attached. I guess its just another ploy or
whatever.
Anyway, Ram or even yourself is free to check Ivan's box
daily. It's on his shelf on the top right-hand top, marked
"Ivan's Mail". It's open to all.
I have no problem with Ram investigating mail being sent to
Ivan as he is instructed to do. I normally send it out on
Thursday's or Friday.
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All I want to do is come to work and do what is required of
me from 9:00 a- 5:00 p and either go to school or home to
BABY. I do not wish to defend myself against my colleagues
in such a negative manner because this is not a team I wish to
be part of idiocies such as these are a waste of effort and
skills. We all have so much positive and meaningful skills to
offer that are not being used because of intimidation for one
another.
Let's stop trying to hurt each other and just get along so that
the AI can standup and be one of the best. There are some
very good people working here! Regards!
Grievant's supervisor in turn sent Grievant the following:
Audrey, you are missing the point. You misdirected the mail
because you were not paying attention and did not review
what you were sending to Ivan. If you had, you would have
seen that there was a note on these documents from Ivan
requesting that they be put on his desk for filing. Your
performance was inadequate.
I am giving you a directive to show Ram what you are
mailing to Ivan before you mail it. It is insubordinate of you
to tell me that we (Ram and I) can always go and look in
Ivan's box to see what is being sent to him.
You are not to send any more insolent notes to me or Ram,
like the one you just sent. To do so again would be
automatically considered as an act of insubordination. In the
future, you are only to acknowledge the communication and
ask questions if you are unclear what is to be done. It is not
withinyour puview to insolently, comment on my decisions."
Grievant's response was inappropriate because her remarks are in several respects
insolent and nonresponsive. Moreover, instructions as to how supervisors and others
could or should do their job have no place in a response to a supervisor's communication
designed to ensure Grievant's tasks are completed correctly. The allegations of
inadequate performance were not briefed and are deemed withdrawn.
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The allegations of insubordination and misconduct under this charge are sustained.
The allegations of inadequate performance under this charge are dismissed.
Charge 32
On or about October 14,1997, you were insubordinate
and engaged in misconduct when you disobeyed a
directive from your department head to sit at Ivan
Kazen's desk to answer the unit's phones, while the phone
at your desk was being repaired. Your only explanation
was that there was no air in that area and you couldn't
breathe. That area is not walled off and you offered no
medical evidence that the ventilation was not sufficient to
breathe. You simply refused to sit where assigned and
refused to perform your normal assigned responsibilities.

Grievant admittedly refused an assignment involving her sitting at another's desk
which had a working phone. As a result, another employee had to answer all of the
incoming calls. Grievant refused on the basis that the air around that desk would not
allow her to breathe properly.
Grievant has medical problems, including asthma, but there is no objective
evidence supporting an air quality problem. The desk to which Grievant was assigned is
close to another she occupied around the same time without complaint. There is nothing
to support a conclusion that Grievant had a good faith reason to believe that her health
would be endangered if she performed the assignment given her. Rather, the reason was
advanced so that Grievant might avoid having to do the work. That the Employer later
arranged for the phone to be moved to Grievant's desk does not excuse the Grievant's
refusal to comply with the Employer's instruction.
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The allegations of insubordination and misconduct under this charge are sustained.
Charge 33
For the period of November 19 - 26, 1997 you engaged in
misconduct when you were absent from work without
authorization. You were insubordinate when you called in
to report part of the absence and failed as per office
protocol to speak directly to your supervisor. Your
responses to your supervisor when questioned about the
absences were also insubordinate.
There is conflicting evidence as to whether Grievant requested leave in writing for
the period November 19 through November 26. There is a PROFS note to this effect
from the Grievant which the Employer argues must either have been never sent or never
received because all of the Employer's and Grievant's actions and statements are
inconsistent with that written request having been made. The conflict need not be
resolved because even if the request was made, the only approval was granted orally for
leave from November 19 through the 21st. That aspect of the charge is dismissed. That
the approval was not in writing cannot be attributed to any fault of Grievant.
November 22 and 23 were not workdays for the Grievant. For the period
November 24 through November 26, mere was no approval for leave. At most, Grievant
merely informed supervisory personnel by telephone that she would not be at work. This
was not in compliance with office requirements known to the Grievant.
Grievant's supervisor informed Grievant that she was absent without
authorization in the following PROFS note:
I would like to inform you that your absence during the
period 11/19 - 11/26/97 wrere unauthorized. You will be
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informed of the action to be taken. Also, please be informed
that a clean and authentic copy of the Court's Order ...is
hereby requested regarding your absence.
Grievant responded as follows:

Hi Ram:
I spoke with my lawyer regarding our conversation this
morning, as well as transferring the call to you and he advised
me that if there is a problem, my office should feel free to call
him. Also, please feel free to take whatever action you find it
necessary because this is not about authority, this is about my
grandson. And that is what's important to me!!!
Regards!
Grievant's response is not itself insubordinate, but her unexplained failure to
produce the court order is insubordinate. The leave was requested because Grievant
allegedly needed to be present at her apartment while building code violations were being
abated pursuant to court order. Thus, the court order was relevant to the request for leave
and to the supervisor's evaluation of the request.
The allegations of misconduct and insubordination under this charge are sustained
to the extent noted.

Charge 34
You engaged in misconduct and performed inadequately
when you failed to maintain adequate levels of attendance.
You have been employed with HRI since September of
1991, yet by the pay period ending 12/24/97 you had zero
hours of sick .leave accruals and minus .25 hours of
vacation leave accruals on your record. You have an
unacceptable pattern of using your accruals as fast as you
earn them, much of which is with unscheduled,

47

undocumented time off. During the period from 1/1/97
through 12/31/97, you had fifty-five (55) days of
unscheduled absences, forty (40) days of which were
without pay.
This charge alleges abuse of leave time. The abuse consists of Grievant having
many unscheduled absences and using leave time as it accrues such that she has a low or
negative leave balance.
Grievant has asthma and diabetes and is hospitalized fairly often. Use of time as it
accrues is not necessarily abuse and there is no evidence that Grievant was not using the
time for the requested and intended purposes. Although absences, whether scheduled or
unscheduled can be disruptive of the work place when in high number or over a
prolonged period of time that, in itself, is not a basis for discipline grounded upon abuse
of leave time. The Employer, not the Grievant, bears the burden of proof and it was not
satisfied. Therefore, Grievant was not required to explain her absences beyond that
which she offered.
The allegations of misconduct and inadequate performance under this charge are
dismissed.
Charge 35
You have been insubordinate, engaged in misconduct,
failed to perform adequately, and have been incompetent
on innumerable occasions in your handling of both
business and personal calls for staff members. You have
jeopardized business contacts, lowered the image of the
WSU in the eyes of its many contacts and caused
difficulties for employees by improperly handling
important personal calls. Everyone in your unit and many
business and personal contacts outside of your unit have
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issued continual complaints about the manner in which
you handle telephone calls. On numerous occasions you
have been insubordinate and engaged in misconduct by
making excessive numbers of personal calls despite having
been counseled against this unacceptable behavior.
Additionally, you stayed on those calls for lengthy periods
of time in which you have failed to complete assignments
and failed to get off of personal calls to answer business
calls. Specifically you have been cited as:
- Mumbling when answering the phone such that callers
are unable to decipher if they have reached the correct
location.
- Answering the phone in a discourteous, rude and
unprofessional manner.
- Rushing to get callers off the line.
- Not being helpful and not offering to take messages from
callers.
- Giving staff members incorrect and incomplete messages
including wrong return phone numbers.
- Spending far too much time on personal phone calls even
when you have been instructed not to do so.
- Not picking up ringing phones from the other unit when
their secretary is away from her desk, as per previous
instructions and written protocol.
- Continuing to talk on personal calls when other staff
member lines are ringing.
You have been counseled many times throughout your
five year employment in Women's Services concerning
your unacceptable handling of the phones. Following are a
few recent specific examples of your inadequate
performance in this area:
- On January 29,1997 a member of the Deputy Director
of the AIDS Institute, called to speak to Diane Rudnick,
who works on the South side of the floor. You answered
the phone in an unintelligible manner and did not offer to
transfer the call from the North side of the office where
you work, to the South side to look for Ms. Rudnick.

49

- A letter was received from an office outside of the AIDS
Institute addressed to a WSU contract manager which
stated: " I called you on Monday, 4/28/97 and your
reception person put me on hold for about five minutes,
thinking she was going to get you, and (then she} just took
a message. Not very professional, call me!"
- An e-mail was received on February 13,1997 by one of
the contract managers which read: "I called you awhile
ago and your phone,... was answered by someone who
was just one step below surly. She had no idea whether I
was your friend, your mother, or the Mayor's office. She
was just unpleasant. I did not leave a message, because
she made me want to get off the phone immediately. And I
did. It was clear to me - an assumption, to be fair - that
she would really resent taking a message.
Maybe she needs voice lessons. Or perhaps, a serious
attitude adjustment. Whichever it is, don't let her answer
your phone anymore until it's taken care of. "Cause no
one will ever call you again."
- On February 10,1997 you gave a phone message to a
program manager just stating that "Lori" called. You did
not take down the last name of the caller or their phone
number. The program manager had to reiterate to you
that it was essential for you to take down the full name of
the caller, the telephone number where they can be
reached, and the caller's affiliation and message. The
program manager knew of several Lori's and had no idea
of which one it was. The same program manager had
issued these same instructions to you less than two weeks
before this current issue.
- On February 20,1997 Lori King from the Albany ISO
unit called to speak to one of the program managers. She
finally sent the following PROFS note about your
behavior: "I tried to call you today but your secretary
would not take a message, (sounds like you need help
down there)."
- Your failure to adequately handle the phones prompted
a memo from your department head to your immediate
supervisor to try yet once again to correct this on going
problem. That memo is attached as appendix "A".
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- On March 11, 1997 one of the program managers issued
a complaint to your supervisor concerning your inability
to competently handle the telephones. Two of your unit's
contractors had complained to the program manager that
they left messages for the manager, but you never gave the
manager the messages. This failure to adequately transmit
messages made the Women's Services Unit look
incompetent and inefficient in the eyes of their clients and
is patently unacceptable behavior from any employee.
- On June 24,1997 one of the program managers
complained that when you answered the phone she almost
thought that she had dialed a wrong number. Even after
all the counseling sessions and PROFS notes about your
failure to adequately perform in this area, you still
answered the phone in an incoherent, unintelligible,
monosyllabic and rude manner.
- Despite numerous verbal and written admonishments
and instructions about proper procedures, on August 20,
1997 yet again you were insubordinate, and failed to
perform adequately in the handling of a business call.
When a program manager asked a caller why he didn't
leave a message, the caller responded "the person did not
seem to want to take a message." By being discourteous
and not helpful in handling this caller, the program
manager did not receive information that they needed to
meet a project deadline.
- On September 15, 1997 you received a PROFS note from
one of the program managers about your improper
handling of two personal calls that she had received from
people in Scotland and Panama. The call from Panama
was from the manager's daughter and the message that
you transmitted lead her to believe that her daughter was
in trouble, which was not the case. The program manager
had to spend a great deal of extra time and money trying
to track down the botched calls. You again were
insubordinate, engaged in misconduct and failed to
perform adequately in these instances.
- On or about October 7, 1997 you were insubordinate,
engaged in misconduct and failed to perform adequately
in the manner that you answered a call to managerial staff
from a caller with the AIDS Institute in Albany. Your
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blatant disregard for following proper procedures and
supervisory instructions prompted the caller to report
your actions in an e-mail message as follows: "I placed a
phone call yesterday ...and Audrey Gore answered. {She}
was VERY RUDE AND DISCOURTEOUS! I'm just glad
it was me that placed the call instead of Humberto, or
possibly Gus or Gloria (AIDS Institute top executives).
Audrey had no idea who I was and it was obvious she just
didn't care who she was speaking to. This is a bad
reflection on the Institute. I was fuming all afternoon after
this encounter, so I thought I'd mention it to you." This
action again prompted your department head to give you
instructions on proper phone procedures.
Grievant has an unacceptable, substandard telephone technique that has gone
uncorrected despite repeated counseling and warnings. Many of the Employer's
witnesses, all of whom I credit in this regard, testified similarly.
Grievant is rude, unclear, discourteous, hurried, inaccurate, and generally
unhelpful when speaking with persons attempting to contact her unit. Her behavior
cannot be explained or justified by her medical conditions. There have been many
complaints to this effect, all fully documented and credited. That documentation involves
several different individuals and varied circumstances not warranting specific
elaboration. Grievant's mannerisms are generally and regularly at an unprofessional
level regardless of circumstance. Her behavior constitutes incompetence and inadequate
performance, but not misconduct or insubordination, except as Grievant continued to
spend excessive amounts of time engaged in personal telephone calls despite instructions
to cease that behavior.
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The allegations of insubordination, misconduct, inadequate performance and
incompetency under this charge are sustained to the extent noted.

SECOND NOD
Charge A
On November 14,1997 you were insubordinate, engaged
in misconduct and performed inadequately when you
failed to timely complete the task of typing and copying
the CFA letters even after being reminded by your
supervisor of their importance. You engaged in
misconduct when you sent your supervisor a response that
included "All you really had to do was ask! ".
Grievant was instructed to complete continued funding application (CFA) form
letters on the morning of Friday, November 14, 1997. Grievant was told the work was to
be done immediately. Grievanfs supervisor checked with Grievant several times to
review the status of the work after informing Grievant the forms were needed by 2:30 or
3:30 p.m. when an employee from Albany, who was assisting with CFA letters, was
returning to Albany. Grievant at approximately 1:30 p.m., told her supervisor the letters
were done and had only to copy them on the correct paper. But by 2:30 p.m., the letters
were not done. By Monday, the 17th, Grievanfs supervisor still had not received the
letters.
Grievant claims that she put the letters on her supervisor's desk, but there is no
evidence as to when they were placed there.
The proof as to this allegation is inconclusive in certain respects. It is possible that
the documents were finished and put on the supervisor's desk before the close of business
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on the Friday. It is clear, however, that the documents were not done by 2:30 p.m. and
that Grievant knew a person was waiting for them.
As Grievant's other work had been suspended, her failure to complete the task by
2:30 p.m. was unreasonable and incompetent, as was her failure to specifically notify
either her supervisor or another in appropriate authority that the documents were finished,
assuming they were. Grievant had many times been told that completion of work in a
timely fashion was expected and that an inability to comply was to be on notice to
persons in supervision.
Grievant's written response to her supervisor's inquiry regarding the assignment
was inappropriate in tone and content. In her response, Grievant tells her supervisor
it doesn't take a lot of thought to figure out that I would not
still have any CFA letters since I was informed they had to be
done by COB. Any reminder concerning this is beyond my
knowledge because if there were a 2:30 p.m. or any othertime of alleged reminder, 1 assume this PROFS would not be
necessary.. .All you had to do was really ask!

The allegations of insubordination, misconduct and inadequate performance under
this charge are sustained to the extent noted.
Charge B
On November 19 - November 26,1997 you were
insubordinate and engaged in misconduct when you were
away from work without authorization, and without
having given appropriate documentation regarding your
anticipated leave to your supervisor as was directed.
When told upon your return to work that the leave was
being termed unauthorized, you indicated that you didn't
care because you weren't going to be paid for it anyway.
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This charge repeats Charge 33 in the first NOD. except as it concerns Grievant's
alleged statement on return to work.
This statement, even if made, which the Employer argues reflects an attitude of
indifference, is not a proper basis for discipline. It was a response to the Employer's
statements that her leave was unauthorized which meant she would not be paid.
The allegations of insubordination and misconduct under this charge are
dismissed.
Charge C
On December 31,1997 you were given the task of making
up four (4) file folders for the department head. You were
insubordinate and failed to perform adequately when you
did not timely complete this simple task. It was completed
and given to the unit head January 30, 1998. Unit staff
cannot hope to be efficient when the support that they
depend on from you takes inordinately long. You were
insubordinate when you failed to follow the office protocol
given to you in September 1996 which specifies that you
inform staff when you are delayed or unable to complete a
task.
A task assigned on December 31, 1997 to make up four file folders was not
completed until January 30, 1998. Grievant was out from work from December 31
through January 5, 1998, but she still had more than enough time to complete an
assignment that should not take more than a few minutes according to the record.
Grievant did not notify supervisors of any reason for the delay although the need to do so
had been impressed upon her many times.
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The allegations of insubordination and inadequate performance under this charge
are sustained.
Charge D
On or about January 26,1998 it was discovered that you
were insubordinate, incompetent and failed to perform
adequately when after almost five (5) months you still had
not followed a directive to order a file cabinet for your
department head. Additionally, you engaged in
misconduct when you made inappropriate remarks about
your supervisor in a PROFS note to your department
head regarding the incident.
Grievant did not order a file cabinet as directed in September 1997 until several
months later. Grievant's explanation that she had been told others had taken care of it is
not credited.
After Grievant's supervisor inquired as to the status of the purchase order,
Grievant responded to the department head, not her supervisor. Grievant stated that her
supervisor had "changed his tune" about having taken care of the order.
The supervisor made only an inquiry about the status of a purchase order. A
response that by-passes the supervisor and accuses him of lying is unprofessional and
inappropriate.
The allegations of insubordination, incompetency and inadequate performance
under this charge are sustained.
Charge E
On January 27,1998 your supervisor gave you provider's
quarterly program reports to file in the appropriate file
folders. You were incompetent and failed to perform
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adequately when you filed the reports in folders for a
contract year which had not as yet begun. Your
incompetence and inadequate performance caused double
the work to correct the task. The previously filed folders
had to be retrieved and then filed correctly. Filing is the
most basic of clerical tasks and Management expected
that you would have been able to complete this simple
task without incident. You were insubordinate when you
did not answer a PROFS note from your supervisor
specifically instructing you to confirm receipt of the note.
Grievant misfiled quarterly program reports as alleged. Grievant filed them with
reports for the 1998-99 contract year when the reports covered the 1997-98 contract year.
Filing is a basic task and inability or unwillingness to perform the task accurately is
incompetence. Any inaccuracy as to date of occurrence is inconsequential as I credit the
Employer's witnesses who testified that the work assignment was given.
That aspect of the charge alleging Grievant's alleged failure to answer a PROFS
note was not briefed and is deemed withdrawn.
The allegations of incompetency and inadequate performance under this charge
are sustained. The allegations of insubordination are dismissed.
Charge F
On February 3,1998 you were incompetent and failed to
perform adequately when you copied the incorrect pages
of CFAs. The instructions for the task had been given to
you in writing, and yet you still failed to perform this
simple task of copying documents correctly.
Grievant miscopied CFA's as alleged by copying the wrong pages despite written
instructions.
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The allegations of incompetency and inadequate performance under this charge
are sustained.
Charge G
On February 3,1998 you were insubordinate, engaged in
misconduct and failed to perform adequately when you
refused to work with the appropriate administrative staff
to get a copier fixed. You were contentious and openly
hostile when informing a program staff member that you
would not complete this task. As a unit support person, it
is your responsibility to perform administrative work
such as ordering supplies and seeing to it that equipment
is operable.
Contract Manager Hecht inquired of Grievant what procedure should be followed
to have a broken copier fixed. In questioning whether Office Manager Morrison would
handle it, Grievant told Hecht that she would not work with or talk with Morrison.
Grievant has a responsibility to work cooperatively with all unit staff to ensure the
efficient delivery of services.
Grievant does not deny the substance of the statements, only that they were
misconstrued and that she never refused to work with anyone.
Having credited Hecht's version, I find that Grievant had told her that she would
not work with or through Morrison.
The allegations of insubordination, misconduct and inadequate performance under
this charge are sustained.
Charge H
In or about the week of February 3,1998 you were
insubordinate, engaged in misconduct and failed to
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perform adequately when you yelled and were hostile,
confrontational, argumentative, belligerent, disrespectful
and defiant during a counseling meeting with your
supervisor and department head. You also told your
supervisor that you didn't care if they wrote you up for
your disruptive behavior because you had been written up
before, and that nothing happened then and nothing
would happen now. You also specified that this would not
have any effect on you in terms of you changing your
behavior.
Grievant acted inappropriately and unprofessionally at a February 1998 counseling
session held with her supervisor and department head to discuss with Grievant several of
the problems they had with her work and attitude.
I credit the Employer's witnesses fully. Grievant was loud, disrespectful,
confrontational and defensive at the meeting. At one point she stated that she could be
"written up" by the Employer, but she had been written up many times before and
"nothing had happened" and that "nothing will happen" if she were again charged.
The allegations of insubordination, misconduct and inadequate performance under
this charge are sustained.
Charge I
On March 19,1998 you were insubordinate, incompetent
and failed to perform adequately when you did not pick
up the mail for your unit in the morning. Your
department head had to instruct you again that mail is to
be picked up and distributed several times during the day
and that staff should not have to wait until the end of the
day to receive mail.
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Despite previous instructions, Grievant did not pick up and distribute the mail on
the morning of March 19, 1998. Grievant's failure to recall this incident does nothing to
discredit the Employer's witnesses whom 1 credit.
The allegations of insubordination, misconduct and inadequate performance under
this charge are sustained.
Charge J
On or about April 3,1998 you were insubordinate and
engaged in misconduct when you performed non-business
related work at your desk during working hours. You
were not on a break and had received no authorization
from your supervision to do personal work. Subsequent to
the incident, you openly admitted to your department
head that you were doing personal work instead of
business tasks, when she had approached you with an
assignment to be completed.
Grievant, when confronted by her supervisor, told the supervisor that the work she
was doing was not for the AIDS Institute. Grievant's testimony that she told her
supervisor the work was a cover letter for a promotion within the agency and that her
supervisor said it was "OK" is not credited.
The allegations of insubordination and misconduct under this charge are sustained.

THIRD NOD
Charge A
On April 30,1998 and May 1,1998 you were
insubordinate and failed to perform adequately when in
reporting your absence from work, you did not speak
directly to the person you were instructed to report to
during your supervisor's absence.
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Staff was away on the dates in question and Grievant had been directed to contact
Morrison if Grievant was absent. Grievant did not comply with the directive and instead
informed an office secretary of her absence.
There being no explanation offered for a deliberate refusal to obey a clear
directive, Grievant was insubordinate as alleged.
The allegations of insubordination and inadequate performance under this charge
are sustained.
Charge B
On June 26, 1998 you performed inadequately and
engaged in misconduct when, after being notified a second
time to pick up the office supplies you had ordered, you
refused to pick up the box of supplies and instructed
Robert Morris to contact your supervisor, and tell your
supervisor to pick up the box of supplies.
Grievant was notified that supplies she had ordered were available for pickup.
When the supplies were not picked up, a mailroon staffer called Grievant again. Grievant
refused to pick up the supplies and told the staffer that he should have her supervisor pick
them up.
Grievant's testimony that she went to the mailroom, determined the box was too
heavy to lift, and politely asked the staffer if he could get her some help or if he would
call her supervisor and have him cany it is not credible.
The testimony of the mailroom clerk that the box was very light and easily moved
is credited. The mailroom clerk had no motive to falsify his testimony and he was
specific and certain in his description of the conversation he had with the Grievant.
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The allegations of inadequate performance and misconduct under this charge are
sustained.
Charge C
On June 26,1998 you were insubordinate, and performed
inadequately when you failed to deliver a fax to Roberta
Stewart's desk. You were instructed by Roberta Stewart
to retrieve a fax, which was needed for a conference call.
Ms. Stewart had to leave the conference call and retrieve
the fax herself.
Grievant admits that she did not retrieve a fax the department head needed for a
conference call. Grievant claims the fax was misdirected to a different floor, something
she and the department head discovered at the same time after the conference call ended.
According to the department head, however, she retrieved the fax herself and then
continued her conference call.
Grievant's explanation is not credited. Grievant may have looked for the fax once,
but did not do so again because she was continuously involved with one or more personal
phone calls for a lengthy period of time.
The allegations of insubordination and inadequate perf ormance under this charge
are sustained.
Charge D
On June 26,1998 you were insubordinate, engaged in
misconduct and performed inadequately when you were
instructed by your supervisor to get off the telephone
immediately because you had been on the telephone for
the period from 9:20 a.m. until 11:20 a.m. You were to
immediately inform him of what tasks you were working
on since your arrival to work that morning at 9:20 a.m.
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You responded at 3:20 p.m. on June 26, to inform him of
the tasks you had been working on, none of which
required making any telephone calls.
On June 26, Grievant was ordered at approximately 11:40 a.m. to account
immediately for the work she had done up to that point. Grievant did not respond until
3:20 p.m. Her response contains no reference to her being on the telephone. The
Employer's witnesses who testified that Grievant was on the phone that entire morning
are fully credited.
I find that the Grievant's response was late and untruthful.
The allegations of insubordination, misconduct and inadequate performance under
this charge are sustained.
Charge E
On or about July 29, 1998 you failed to perform
adequately and were incompetent, when your supervisor
discovered, that a filing assignment that was given to you
on April 28, 1998 was still not completed on July 29,1998.
You had been given explicit instructions to carry out the
assignment.
Grievant was given an assignment in April 1998 to file certain documents. In July
1998, Grievanfs supervisor found on his desk a folder with the reports that had not been
filed. Grievanfs testimony that she does not recall either the assignment or seeing the
folder is not credited.
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Grievant's supervisor gave her both written and oral instructions regarding the
assignment. It is not possible that Grievant was unaware of it, she simply did not do the
work.
The allegations of inadequate performance and incompetency under this charge
are sustained.
Charge F
On or about July 30,1998 you engaged in misconduct,
and failed to perform adequately when you made an error
in a filing assignment given to you by your supervisor.
This was a repeated error on your part and again you had
to be reminded of the importance of timely and accurate
filing of all documents and how retrieving and refiling the
same documents impacts the Unit's workload.
Grievant admits she filed the documents in question incorrectly. They should
have been filed in the 1997-98 contract period. Instead, they were filed in 1998-99
contact folders.
The allegations of inadequate performance under this charge are sustained. The
misconduct allegations are dismissed.
Charge G
On or about December 21, 1998 you engaged in
misconduct and inadequate performance when you
answered the telephone in a tone that was inaudible and
allowed—the caller to wait for approximately ninety
seconds, causing the. caller to hang up. When the caller
tried again, your tone was again inaudible and you
disconnected the caller.
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Grievant is alleged to have twice taken a call from the same person who testified
that Grievant mumbled, put her on hold, after which the caller hung-up.
Grievant explained that around this time she was having severe asthma attacks that
may have made her voice inaudible.
This charge is dismissed. There is insufficient evidence that Grievant was
intentionally rude to the caller.
The allegations of misconduct and inadequate performance under this charge are
dismissed.

OPINION
As I have found, the record evidence establishes that Grievant is guilty of many of
the charges of misconduct, insubordination, incompetency and inadequate performance,
acts that have continued over a prolonged period of time.
In evaluating the charges I have sustained, it is important that they be considered
in their totality. If viewed separately, few of the charges would be serious enough to
afford the Employer a reasonable basis for termination. But these charges cannot be
fairly viewed in isolation for to do so would foster a completely inaccurate view of the
Grievant's serious and prolonged performance problems. Grievant is not an employee
who has occasionally made a few minor mistakes on the job. Rather, she is an employee
who for a long period of time has been unwilling to correctly perform even the simplest
of job duties. Grievant is, quite simply, indifferent to her performance and insensitive to
the burdens she has imposed on coworkers, supervisors and managers. Grievant is

65

apparently not interested in her job and has become unwilling to do it. Grievant has
given her personal business higher priority. Grievant is distracted, confrontational,
arrogant, uncooperative and uncaring about her employment. She rejects any counseling
and has made no effort to improve her performance, which is at an unacceptably low
level that has caused others to assume her duties. She is unwilling and unable to accept
constructive criticism or the counseling which was offered to help her improve her
performance to an acceptable level. She is consistently of the opinion that there is
nothing wrong with her job performance or her attitude. When errors are pointed out to
her, she reacts, almost without exception, defensively with allegations that others, who
are out to sabotage her, are at fault. Remarks to supervisory and managerial personnel
and fellow employees are routinely insolent, unprofessional and, occasionally, incoherent
(e.g., her "closet" comments).
Grievant has had several supervisors over the years, all of whom have tried
through counseling and otherwise to make Grievant a productive employee. The
Grievant has been given repeated, clear guidance as to what her several supervisors have
regarded to be her job duties, her performance deficiencies, and what they expected
Grievant to do to correct those deficiencies. Despite this, Grievant's work has been poor
for a long time and it remained poor up until she was suspended. Their efforts have not
only failed, but Grievant irrationally views these good faith efforts as acts of sabotage
and violations of her work environment.
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Grievant's prior discipline in 1994, resulting in a two-week unpaid suspension,
was no more successful in improving Grievant's performance than were her prior and
subsequent verbal and written counselings.
Termination is the Employer's only viable option because I believe that a
demotion or retraining would not serve to turn Grievant into a productive, cooperative
employee. Grievant had many chances to change her attitude and improve her work, but
she took advantage of none of them. Options other than termination are all the more
untenable considering that Grievant basically refuses to recognize that her work is
deficient in any material respect. Her unwillingness to perform even the simplest tasks as
instructed when coupled with her open hostility toward persons within and without the
agency created a work environment that the Employer need no longer tolerate.
In general summary and conclusion, Grievant has shown a manifest
incompatibility with her job and her job duties. The Employer's decision to terminate the
Grievant's employment was reasonable and not arbitrary or capricious. That being so,
there is no basis to rescind that action.
Certain defenses raised to the charges, some of which have been previously
discussed, are summarized here.
Any inaccuracy as to dates is excused as nonprejudicial to Grievant.
Grievant had ample notice that acts of misconduct or incompetency would be the
subject of discipline, including discharge. That notice is present in the collective
bargaining agreement itself, in Arbitrator Scheinman's 1994 consent award issued upon
the two 1993 notices of discipline, and in the many comments made by supervisory staff
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over the years when cited deficiencies were brought to Grievant's attention, including the
1996 Protocol. Grievant herself acknowledged her familiarity with disciplinary
proceedings when she told her supervisors they could write her up if they wanted but
nothing would happen to her.
Claimed deficiencies in proof have been discussed in the disposition of each
specific charge. The few charges lacking an adequate evidentiary basis have been
dismissed.
Claims that staff were somehow out to "get" the Grievant are rejected. If
anything, and as discussed in the section dealing with the suspension, supervisors waited
longer than they needed before acting. This is not evidence of sabotage, but of an
employer that hoped it could avoid having to discipline Grievant. Its efforts were to help
the Grievant, not cause her damage.
The Union's contention that the Employer impermissibly stockpiled charges
against the Grievant is rejected. As many of the Employer's charges are centered on
incompetency and inadequate perf ormance, the number of allegations and the period of
time those allegations cover cannot be regarded as unusual. As mentioned previously, the
Employer bears the burden of proof in this disciplinary proceeding and the nature and
number of allegations are appropriate to the satisfaction of that burden. As the parties'
Agreement limits neither the number of charges nor the period of time they may cover,
the Union's position must be denied.
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SUSPENSION
Under §14.8 of the Agreement, and as relevant, the Employer may suspend an
employee without pay if it determines there is "probable cause to believe" that the
employee's continued presence at work "represents a potential danger to persons or
property" or "would severely interfere with operations."
The Employer does not claim that Grievant was or is a danger to persons or
property. Rather, it claims that Grievant's presence at work would severely interfere with
its operations. The basis for this claim is Grievant's alleged failure to perform even entry
level tasks competently, her open hostility toward staff and others, and her refusal and/or
inability to be productive. This, so the Employer argues, created a hostile and chaotic
work environment that impeded WSU's effective functioning and its reputation in the
health care community. According to the Employer, the negative effects of Grievant's
misconduct and unacceptable work habits permeated all areas of WSU's operations,
including mail, filing, purchases, completion of file folders, excessive use of phones for
personal reasons, inappropriate handling of incoming telephone calls, photocopying and
distribution, scheduling, and interaction with staff and public.
It should be first noted that the "appropriateness" of the Employer's determination
is specifically subject to review by an Arbitrator under the last sentence of §14.8. The
standard of review provided under §14.6 makes the inquiry whether the determination to
suspend was fair and reasonable under all relevant circumstances.
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I have previously discussed in detail the basis for my conclusion that the
Grievant's discharge is wan-anted. Many of those same grounds make the Employer's
determination that Grievant's continued presence on the job would severely interfere with
its operations one that is fair and reasonable under the circumstances.
One issue regarding the suspension warrants discussion. The Grievant was not
suspended until December 30, 1998 when the third NOD was issued. By the Employer's
own admission, however, Grievant's attitude, misconduct and incompetency had been
severely interfering with its operations for a long time prior to December 30, 1998. The
issue becomes, therefore, whether the Employer is denied the right to suspend without
pay that it otherwise had under the Agreement because it did not suspend the Grievant
when it first became apparent that her continued presence at work was severely
interfering with the delivery of the Employer's services. I conclude that the Employer
cannot and should not be penalized with the loss of a right it otherwise possessed because
it waited to suspend until long after the interference first manifested itself.
The parties' rights and obligations regarding disciplinary suspension are part of
the disciplinary process itself. That process embraces the concept of progressive
discipline which the Employer followed in this case. Suspension is a penalty to be
imposed, therefore, as a later option, not one of the first. Moreover, the interests of the
patties to this Agreement and, more importantly, the affected employees, would not be
well served by an interpretation of §14.8 which would result in a loss of a right to
suspend unless it is exercised at the first arguable evidence of severe interference. Such
an interpretation would force the Employer to suspend employees immediately. I cannot
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conclude reasonably that this was the parties' mutual intent in fashioning a limited right
of suspension to protect both the rights of the employer and employees under a
progressive disciplinary system. In short, although the Employer might have been
allowed to suspend the Grievant before December 30, 1998, it was not obligated to do so.
Its decimation to act prior to December 30, 1998 did not forfeit its right under §14.8 to
suspend without pay on and after that date.
AWARD
1. HRTs determination to terminate Audrey Gore for misconduct,
insubordination, inadequate performance and incompetency as set forth in the Notices of
Discipline dated February 12, 1998, April 23, 1998, and December 30, 1998 was not
unjust, arbitrary or capricious and was not in violation of §14.1 of the Agreement.
2. HRI's suspension of Audrey Gore did not violate §14.8 of the Agreement.
The grievances are denied.

Dated:

/& ,

Eric J. Schmertz \J
Arbitrator
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State of New York

)
)ss:
County of New York )
I hereby affirm pursuant to CPLR 7507 that I am the individual described herein
and who executed this instrument which is my Award.

/
EricSchmertz
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